The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal by Effron, Robin J.
William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 51 NO. 6, 2010
           THE PLAINTIFF NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE:        




Two recent Supreme Court cases have stirred the world of pleading
civil litigation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly introduced the con-
cept of “plausibility pleading” in which the plaintiff is required to
plead facts sufficient to suggest that the claim for relief is “plausible,”
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal affirmed that the plausibility standard applies
to all aspects of a complaint subject to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. This Article examines the consequences of the
plausibility standard for pleadings in complex litigation cases.
The Article argues that it is unacceptable to automatically equate
the existence of a class action with a high cost of litigation—a
prominent concern in Twombly and Iqbal—because this reasoning
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fails to differentiate among types of class actions, to differentiate
class actions from other potentially costly types of litigation, and to
account for the efficiencies and judicial economy that some class
actions are, themselves, supposed to create.
The Article then considers the role of the plausibility standard
itself in complex litigation by introducing the plaintiff neutrality
principle, which states that when a plaintiff makes neutral allega-
tions concerning her own condition or conduct—that is, subject to
inferences of both lawful and unlawful conduct on the part of the
defendant—they are not speculative and therefore entitled to a
presumption of truth for the purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.
Complex litigation pleadings, like pleadings in ordinary lawsuits,
contain allegations of conduct and condition that plaintiffs make
about themselves as well as those made about defendants or third
parties. This peculiarity of complex litigation pleading creates an
additional arena of allegations from which one might attack the
factual sufficiency of a complaint: allegations that a named or lead
plaintiff makes about other plaintiffs. For this scenario, a group
plaintiff neutrality principle addresses how inferences drawn from
“neutral” behavior should apply to allegations of class members’
conduct.
The Article concludes by analyzing situations in which the
baseline for plaintiff conduct differs because of publicly available
data about the condition of a group of plaintiffs, particularly those
that are consolidated through multidistrict litigation, rather than as
class actions. It concludes that application of the Twombly/Iqbal
principle to this context may not be as harmful as application to
allegations about defendant conduct because of the plaintiff’s ability
to access the relevant information and, if necessary, replead the case.
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INTRODUCTION
Class actions and other large, aggregated actions are easy targets
for those disparaging the current state of litigation in America.
These critics bemoan the phenomenon of judges allowing supposedly
“nonmeritorious” lawsuits to proceed far enough to force defendants
to choose between mounting an expensive defense or settling the
claims early in the process. Class actions, viewed as expensive both
to litigate and to settle, are singled out as the worst offenders.
Litigation critics have pursued many avenues to minimize the
specter of the nonmeritorious lawsuit. One such tactic is to give
judges increased gatekeeping powers, that is, processes by which
judges can screen nonmeritorious lawsuits and dismiss them before
they reach the latter stages of litigation. Numerous stages in a
lawsuit present the potential for dismissing nonmeritorious cases,
from the opening bell of pleading through a post-trial review of a
jury verdict. For nearly fifty years, courts and commentators viewed
the pleading stage as a relatively weak point for the exercise of
gatekeeping.
This changed with two recent Supreme Court cases concerning
the standard for pleading and its role in litigation.1 The first, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, marked the end of the fifty-year reign of
the pleading mantra familiar to generations of civil procedure
students, that a district court should not dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”2 In Twombly,
the Supreme Court replaced this standard with “plausibility
pleading,” in which the plaintiff is required to plead facts sufficient
to suggest that the claim for relief is “plausible,”3 and in Iqbal,
affirmed that the plausibility standard applies to all aspects of a
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
2. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
3. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 568.
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complaint subject to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.4 
Twombly arose in a complex litigation context, and the Court
intoned several warnings about the “problem[s] of discovery abuse”
and “costs” of class actions.5 Despite this fact, the analyses of
Twombly and Iqbal thus far have treated all forms of litigation as
the same for the purposes of pleading. This Article examines the
consequences of the plausibility standard for pleadings in complex
litigation cases by providing a detailed study of how the
Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to the allegations that are typical
in complaints filed in complex litigation cases.
The inquiry reveals two ways in which isolating the complex
litigation context contributes to a clearer understanding of the
application of Twombly and Iqbal. First, Twombly changes the
landscape for understanding pleadings and causes of action in
complex litigation cases through both direct and indirect applica-
tions of the plausibility pleading standard. Second, a study of class
action pleadings contributes a further clarification of the meaning
of “plausible” in the Twombly and Iqbal opinions themselves, which
has been a subject of considerable confusion among judges, litiga-
tors, and academic commentators.
Complex litigation pleadings, like pleadings in ordinary lawsuits,
contain allegations of conduct and condition that plaintiffs make
about themselves as well as those made about defendants or third
parties. A more robust understanding of the plaintiff plausibility
standard emerges by separating allegations about plaintiffs from
allegations about defendants. Allegations of plaintiff conduct in a
complex litigation complaint, however, sometimes contain specula-
tion about the conduct or condition of other plaintiffs as well as the
conduct of defendants. This peculiarity of complex litigation plead-
ing creates an additional arena of allegations from which one might
attack the factual sufficiency of a complaint. 
In the complex litigation arena, a limited and nuanced application
of the plausibility standard to allegations of both plaintiff and
defendant conduct might actually serve as an effective and fair use
of Twombly and Iqbal. The danger, however, is that a broad or unin-
4. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
5. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
2002 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1997
formed application of Twombly in the complex litigation context
may produce bad outcomes, such as shifting an evidence-based Rule
23 class certification decision to the pleadings-based motion to
dismiss context, resulting in an improper dismissal of an entire
lawsuit rather than a denial of class certification.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I argues that complex
litigation, particularly class actions, presents a special problem
because the named plaintiffs must also plead facts about unnamed
or absent class members that might be viewed as speculative, and
that the plausibility pleading standard might alter doctrines
surrounding class certification. After a brief examination of the
possibility of applying the plausibility standard to motions for class
certification, this Article argues that the Twombly/Iqbal standard
cannot be applied directly to the question of class certification
because Rule 23 class certification is explicitly not a matter to be
pled or decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Part II examines the problems associated with applying the
Twombly/Iqbal standard to allegations of defendant conduct in
complex litigation complaints. Part II.A sets out the doctrinal basis
for tying the level of “plausibility” needed in a complaint to the cost
of litigation in a given case. Focusing on class actions, this section
then demonstrates that both the Supreme Court and lower courts
consistently have presumed class actions to be costly, and thus such
cases are in need of special scrutiny at the motion to dismiss phase
of litigation. 
Part II.B argues that it is unacceptable to automatically equate
the existence of a class action with high costs of litigation because
this comparison fails to differentiate among types of class actions,
and to differentiate class actions from other potentially costly types
of litigation. It also fails to account for the efficiencies and judicial
economy that some class actions are, themselves, supposed to
create. These failures amount to a tension in Twombly that I label
the “efficiency conundrum.” That is, despite increasingly vigorous
efforts to encourage consolidation of litigation to avoid perceived
inefficiencies in the redundant litigation of individual cases,
Twombly singles out class actions and complex cases as especially
dangerous, costly, and in need of tight judicial control early in the
lawsuit. 
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I conclude that judges need to account for whether the cost of
discovery would actually be higher in the absence of an aggregation
device, and also must discount the costs of litigation that are not
associated with the existence of the cause of action, because these
costs fall outside of the scope of Twombly. Part II.C then argues that
the pronounced costs of litigation in class actions that are unac-
counted for at the motion to dismiss stage are still subject to a case-
screening device because class certification serves as a second, and
more appropriate, gate for considering these costs.
In Part III, I turn to the application of the Twombly/Iqbal stan-
dard to allegations of plaintiff conduct. Part III.A introduces the
plaintiff neutrality principle, which states that when a plaintiff
makes neutral allegations concerning her own condition or conduct,
that is, allegations subject to inferences of both lawful and unlawful
conduct on the part of the defendant, these allegations are not
speculative and are therefore entitled to a presumption of truth for
the purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
Part III.B turns to group plaintiff situations, suggesting that if
indeed the Twombly/Iqbal standard is applicable to allegations
regarding plaintiffs, defendants might be more successful on
motions to dismiss certain class action complaints on the ground
that the complaint is too speculative with regard to plaintiff class
member conduct. For defendants, the Twombly/Iqbal standard is
a useful and cost effective tool for disposing of class action cases
because, unlike class certification in which plaintiffs can conduct
discovery into class definition matters, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss concerns only the pleadings. This practice presents a
potential conflict with existing class action case law that discour-
ages judges from deciding issues of class definition at the motion to
dismiss phase, rather than in class certification proceedings. 
Part III.B.1 examines the types of class actions in which there is
no speculation about the conduct or condition of other class
members, so no speculation should be imputed to the named class
representatives. Part III.B.2 discusses the types of complex liti-
gation in which plaintiff speculation is present and arrives at the
group plaintiff neutrality principle which addresses how inferences
drawn from “neutral” behavior should apply to allegations of class
members’ conduct.
2004 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1997
Part III.C addresses situations in which the baseline for plaintiff
conduct differs because of publicly available data about the condi-
tion of a group of plaintiffs, particularly those consolidated as a
multidistrict litigation rather than as class actions. In that Part, I
conclude that application of the Twombly/Iqbal principle to this
context may be less harmful than application of the principle to
allegations about defendant conduct because of the plaintiff’s ability
to access the relevant information and, if necessary, replead the
case.
I. VIEWING PLEADING DOCTRINE THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPLEX
LITIGATION
The development of pleading doctrine from the pre-Federal Rules
era through the recent Twombly revolution is now a well-docu-
mented story.6 This Part summarizes that story with an emphasis
on the role that complex litigation has played in the evolution of
pleading doctrine.
A. Pre-Twombly Pleading Practice
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure crafted Rule
8 to create a liberal notice pleading standard.7 It replaced the code
pleading system8 with the simple requirement that a pleader must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”9 The purpose of pleading under Rule
8,10 in other words, simply was to notify the defendant of the
6. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 890-98 (2009); Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 9-21 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434-39 (2008).
7. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990-
91 (2003).
8. See id. (describing the evolution from common law pleading to code pleading and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a
Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1989).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
10. Certain claims must meet “heightened” pleading standards set forth in FED. R. CIV.
P. 9, or in a statute such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See
infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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existence of a lawsuit and of the grounds for the relief sought. The
Rule was not meant to serve a gatekeeping function for meritorious
lawsuits.11
For nearly fifty years, courts interpreted Rule 8 according to the
famous Conley v. Gibson12 formulation that “a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”13 
The aim of a notice pleading system is to isolate the filing of a
complaint and confine it to a very narrow purpose: the initiation of
a lawsuit.14 Matters of proof and the relative merits of a lawsuit are
governed by other rules and procedural devices15 because Rule 8 was
to be “part of a procedural system structured to foster the determi-
nation of cases on the merits.”16 It was the role of “summary judg-
ment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims.”17
During this time, the Court engaged in a tug of war with the
lower courts over the requirements of Rule 8.18 The lower courts
drifted toward heightened pleading requirements for a variety of
11. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 877 (2008) (“The drafters rejected ... pleading rules ... which
generally required a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish a cause of action.”); Spencer,
supra note 6, at 434 (arguing that Rule 8 had been written so that “pleadings were no longer
to be a substantial hurdle to be overcome before plaintiffs could gain access to the courts”).
But see Bone, supra note 6, at 892-93 (arguing that in the debates leading to the adoption of
the federal rules, not everyone agreed that the standard for Rule 8(a)(2) should be notice
pleading).
12. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
13. Id. at 45-46.
14. See Bone, supra note 6, at 880 (observing that notice pleading “rejects case screening
as a pleading function”).
15. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last
Phase—Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New
Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937) (stating that devices such as discovery and summary
judgment mean that courts “do not need to force the pleadings to their less appropriate
function”); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
16. Fairman, supra note 7, at 994 (emphasis added).
17. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
512-13 (2002) (discussing the role of summary judgment in adjudicating a case on the merits).
18. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of
Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG.
1, 17-18 (2008) (“Twombly represents the culmination of decades of guerilla warfare on notice
pleading.”).
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causes of action.19 Some judges would dismiss complaints lacking a
certain level of factual detail,20 reasoning, for example, that the
Conley standard “has never been taken literally.”21 In two separate
decisions, the Supreme Court pulled back to reinforce the Conley
standard that a plaintiff is not “‘require[d] ... to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim.’”22 Throughout this period,
academic commentators echoed the Supreme Court’s holdings that
Rule 8 was designed “simply ‘[to] give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff ’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”23 
Complex litigation was often front and center in efforts to use a
case-screening mechanism, persisting through special federal rules,
Rule 9,24 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA).25 The pleading provisions of the PSLRA are directly
addressed to class actions, while Rule 9(b) applies to any complaint
alleging fraud or mistake.26 
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement reflects a belief that law-
suits alleging fraud are more likely to be frivolous or harmful to the
defendant.27 Rule 9(b) often appears in the complex litigation setting
because of the popularity of consumer fraud class action suits.28
19. Fairman, supra note 7, at 997 (describing “the reality of federal court [pleading]
practice” during this period as “using all manner of fact-based particularity requirements”);
Amanda Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases: Should Courts
Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2177, 2198-2205 (2008) (describing varying pleading standards applied to Alien Tort Statute
cases pre-Twombly).
20. See Fairman, supra note 7, at 990-91.
21. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (“In practice, ‘a complaint
... must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’”).
22. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
23. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at
47).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (mandating heightened pleading in particular cases).
25. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
27. See Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike Rule 9(b), 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 291-96 (2004) (describing protection of defendants’ reputations and
deterrence of frivolous claims and strike suits as two common rationalizations for the
existence of Rule 9(b)).
28. Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by
Requiring Plaintiffs To Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1
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These lawsuits often use state law consumer fraud statutes as the
cause of action. They are frequently litigated as class action product
liability suits because the actions typically do not require an
individual showing of reliance29 and are therefore more amenable to
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).30 Because most of these
actions can only be maintained as class actions if the claim for relief
is restricted to the consumer fraud claim, these lawsuits have, in
effect, been subject to a form of “heightened pleading” for quite some
time. Defendants seizing on the application of the 9(b) heightened
pleading standard stress the necessity of pleading fraud with
particularity to stem the so-called “abusive” practices of class action
litigation. Although some judges and commentators have explained
that Rule 9(b) merely serves the purpose of notice pleading,31
complex cases nonetheless loom large over the rule’s heightened
pleading requirement.
The PSLRA similarly focuses on complex litigation as a target for
pleading reform. This statute, which Congress passed in the mid-
1990s to address perceived abuses of class action shareholder
derivative suits,32 “requires plaintiffs to state with particularity ...
the facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s intention ‘to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”33 A strong inference “must be
more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent
intent.”34 The PSLRA also addresses the particularity with which
plaintiffs must state allegations of fraud, “insist[ing] that securities
fraud complaints ‘specify’ each misleading statement; that they set
forth the facts ‘on which [a] belief ’ that a statement is misleading
(2006).
29. See id. at 23-30 (describing the standards for reliance and causation in state law
consumer fraud statutes).
30. Id. at 2-3.
31. See Fairman, supra note 7, at 991 n.23 (listing cases in which the function of Rule 9(b)
is understood as providing a higher degree of “fair notice”).
32. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleading
Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical
Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 431 (reporting that Congress passed the PSLRA because it
believed it “was necessary to curb the frequency of baseless securities class actions that were
being filed to extort recoveries as a consequence of lax procedural protections of defendants”).
33. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (quoting Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976)).
34. Id. at 314.
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was ‘formed’; and that they ‘state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.’”35 This requires plaintiffs to “do more than say that
the statements ... were false and misleading; they must demonstrate
with specificity why and how that is so.”36 
As a result, judges handling securities fraud class actions
routinely deal with three pleading standards: Rule 9(b) for fraud,
the PSLRA for scienter, and Rule 8(a)(2) for the remaining aspects
of the complaint.37 Class actions, then, played a central role in the
maintenance and development of heightened pleading standards
that ultimately led to the Twombly decision.38 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly39 was an antitrust class action
brought against incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), the
regional telecommunications companies that were created after the
break-up of AT&T.40 The Telecommunications Act of 199641 required
the ILECs to share their networks with competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs) in order to introduce competition into the telecom-
munications market.42 The plaintiffs were representatives of a
putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed
35. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-
4(b)(1), (2)).
36. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2004).
37. Backe v. Novatel Wireless, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (applying
Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 9(b), and PSLRA pleading standards to securities fraud class action); In re
Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 513, 528-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(same); In re Dot Hill Sys. Corp. Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2008)
(same).
38. The Twombly decision itself, however, did not require a heightened pleading standard
synonymous with Rule 9(b) itself. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448796 (“[T]he Court did not reimpose a heightened-pleading
requirement.... [F]or the first time, pleadings must undergo a test not for factual detail, but
for factual convincingness.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 55), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=1442786
(“If Rule 8 were construed to require additional details about events alleged in a complaint,
then what purpose would Rule 9(b) serve?”).
39. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
40. For a more detailed description of the facts that led to the Twombly case, see
Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 879-81.
41. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
42. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
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Internet service during a roughly ten-year period.43 The plaintiffs
alleged that the ILECs had violated section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act44 by overcharging the CLECs for access to the
networks, providing inferior service, and agreeing to avoid compet-
ing in each other’s markets.45
As evidence of the conspiracy, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged
“the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in
one another’s markets, and ... the parallel course of conduct that
each engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs.”46 They further
alleged the existence of an agreement in restraint of trade simply by
stating that defendants and their coconspirators “entered into a
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in
their respective ... markets.”47
The Supreme Court held that, based on the allegations in the
complaint, the plaintiffs had not stated a claim under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.48 The Court began with the premise that allega-
tions of conscious parallel conduct alone are insufficient for a section
1 claim.49 The cause of action requires allegations of an agreement.50
The Court held that a complaint merely alleging the existence of an
agreement did not meet the requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) because the
Rule “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”51 Instead,
“stating a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”52
The Court had previously rejected a plausibility pleading
standard, stating that “Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard
43. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
45. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.
46. Id. at 551 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Plaintiff’s complaint).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 556-57.
49. Id. at 557 (“A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken,
needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; without that
further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant’s
commercial efforts stays in neutral territory.”); id. at 553 (“Even ‘conscious parallelism’ ... is
‘not in itself unlawful.’” (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993))).
50. Id. at 553.
51. Id. at 555.
52. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
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without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.
‘Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”53 Twombly
changed this standard by explicitly retiring Conley’s “no set of facts”
language.54
The Twombly decision moved pleading requirements from the
realm of the possible to the realm of the plausible. This is significant
given the efforts the Supreme Court and commentators previously
made to dispel the “myth” of notice pleading.55 The Twombly Court
held that the plaintiff was responsible for “identifying facts that
are suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible,”56 and
grounded plausibility pleading within the text of Rule 8(a)(2), in-
terpreting the rule to mean that the allegations in the complaint
must “possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”57
The plaintiffs’ allegations were conclusory; “[a]n allegation of
parallel conduct” which “is thus much like a naked assertion of con-
spiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to
relief.’”58
While the exact level of detail that Twombly requires remains
unclear, at the very least, the case stands for the proposition that a
complaint meeting the minimum “no set of facts” standard from
Conley no longer qualifies as “plausible.” In its Twombly opinion,
the Court rejected the Second Circuit’s position that it would be
permissible to “include conspiracy among the realm of ‘plausible’
possibilities in order to survive a motion to dismiss,” and that “to
rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail to
53. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
54. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (“After puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative
gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”).
55. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
56. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
57. Id. at 557 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2).”
(emphasis added)).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude
that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demon-
strate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of
collusion rather than coincidence.”59
Some proponents of the plausibility pleading standard introduced
by the Supreme Court in Twombly argue that the Court’s holding is
especially appropriate in light of the fact that the Twombly case
itself was a large antitrust class action.60 They emphasize the
Court’s reasoning that a plaintiff should have a plausible basis for
a claim before proceeding to potentially expensive discovery.61 One
clear rule to emerge from Iqbal, however, is that the Twombly
plausibility standard applies to all Rule 8 pleadings and is not to be
limited to the antitrust context.62 
These commentators suggest that the drafters of the original Rule
8(a)(2) did not anticipate the advent of modern complex litigation.
Thus, the argument goes, while the Conley interpretation of the
Rule might have made sense in the early decades of the Federal
Rules, the newer Twombly standard is appropriate in the era of
large and complex cases.63 Although Twombly has been painted as
“reviving” the use of “heightened pleading” standards in federal
courts, even critics acknowledge that heightened pleading require-
ments never really disappeared in federal practice.64 
Twombly, however, did not directly adopt a standard from the
complex litigation context, nor did it clarify the precise meaning of
59. Id. at 553 (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)).
60. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61 (2007).
61. Id. at 76-77, 81.
62. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Though Twombly determined the
sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation
and application of Rule 8.”).
63. Epstein, supra note 60, at 98 (“The current provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were designed in an earlier era for litigation that on average has been far simpler
than litigation today. The Rules operated on an assumption that the greater risks in civil
litigation came from the premature dismissal of meritorious cases brought by ordinary people
of little means or sophistication. The large modern business dispute or class action does not
fit into that template at all.”).
64. See Patricia W. Hatamayar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Really
Matter, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 598 (2010) (challenging characterizations of the pre-Twombly
era with empirical findings that reveal “[c]learly, the endlessly repeated old saw that ‘12(b)(6)
motions are viewed with disfavor and rarely granted’ should be laid to rest” (citation
omitted)). See generally Fairman, supra note 7, passim.
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“plausible.” Thus, it is no surprise that this recent jurisprudence has
generated more questions than it has answered.65 Since the decision,
judges and commentators have focused on answering the most
immediate of the open questions: what is the meaning of “plausible,”
and what level of factual detail must plaintiffs state in a
complaint?66 Most likely, the answer to the second question lies
somewhere between a bald assertion of wrongdoing and a wholesale
return to fact pleading.67 Just a few weeks after the Twombly
decision, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision in
Erickson v. Pardus in which it purported to reaffirm notice
pleading.68 The plaintiff, a prisoner suffering from Hepatitis C,
claimed that the prison and prison doctor were endangering his life
by withholding his medication.69 The Court rejected the Tenth
65. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Considerable uncertainty
concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by
the Supreme Court’s decision.”); Bone, supra note 6, at 881 (“The Court’s criticism of Conley
has caused a great deal of confusion.”); Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 14 (“The line separating
fact from conclusion is not easy to draw and never has been.”).
66. See, e.g., Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he new
formulation is less than pellucid.”); Bone, supra note 6, at 881 (“‘Plausible’ corresponds to a
probability greater than ‘possible.’ Exactly how much greater is uncertain.”); Cavanagh, supra
note 11, at 879 (“The Court expressly ‘retired’ Conley v. Gibson and, in so doing, put an end
to notice pleading as it has been understood in the seventy years since the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive
Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to
Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 606 (2007) (“[W]ithin three months of the decision,
808 lower federal courts opinions had cited the case, often taking divergent views of what it
meant.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6
(2009) (“A central question in the wake of Twombly is whether so-called notice pleading
survived the decision.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion
To Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly 15-18 (Oct. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1494683 (arguing that Swierkiewicz is no longer good
law). Professor Hatamayar has conducted preliminary empirical analysis of dismissal before
and after the Twombly and Iqbal decisions and has concluded that “Iqbal combined with
Twombly may have already resulted in significantly more 12(b)(6) motions being granted than
under Conley.” Hatamayar, supra note 64, at 2.
67. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.5 (2007) (“The border in DM Research
was the line between the conclusory and the factual. Here it lies between the factually neutral
and the factually suggestive. Each must be crossed to enter the realm of plausible liability.”);
see also Bone, supra note 6, at 883 (describing the Court’s departure from notice pleading as
“modest”); Steinman, supra note 38, at 23-30 (arguing that “The most significant pre-Twombly
authorities on federal pleading standard are still good law” and that “plausibility is not in fact
the primary inquiry” (or “even a necessary one” after Twombly and Iqbal)).
68. 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 89-93.
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Circuit’s finding that the allegations were too conclusory to support
a § 1983 claim, and even went so far as to say that “[s]pecific facts
are not necessary” under Rule 8(a)(2).70 Perhaps the Court meant to
signal that it had not endorsed a detailed fact-pleading regime.71
The language of Twombly, however, unmistakably identifies
plausibility as the new touchstone for pleading analysis and the
Court confirmed this interpretation in the recent case Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.72
In Iqbal, the plaintiff, a Muslim Pakistani man, sued a number
of federal officials in a Bivens action for constitutional violations
that occurred while he was detained in a federal facility following
the September 11th attacks.73 He alleged that his arrest was the
result of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of his race,
religion, and national origin, and that he was subjected to unconsti-
tutionally harsh treatment while detained.74 Iqbal named numerous
federal officials in his complaint including former Attorney General
John Ashcroft and former FBI director Robert Mueller, claiming
that they were responsible for adopting the unconstitutional policy
that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations;75 Ashcroft was
named as “‘principal architect’ of the policy” and Mueller was named
as “instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implemen-
tation.”76 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must plead
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”77 
The Court clarified the Twombly standard by characterizing it as
a two-pronged analysis: a court must first identify the statements
70. Id. at 93.
71. See Bone, supra note 6, at 883-84 (“The Court’s approval of liberal pleading does not
contradict its holding; it qualifies and explains that holding by indicating that ‘plausibility’
should not be interpreted as a demanding standard.”).
72. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
73. Id. at 1942.
74. Id. at 1944.
75. Id. at 1942.
76. Id. at 1944.
77. Id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court
further held that to sustain a Bivens cause of action, the plaintiff had to show that
“petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral,
investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or
national origin.” Id. at 1948-49. Mere knowledge of the policies is insufficient as a matter of
law. Id. at 1949.
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in a complaint that are bare legal conclusions and therefore not
entitled to an assumption of truth, then search the complaint for
sufficient factual allegations that, if taken as true, show that the
claim for relief is plausible.78 
Due to the Court’s emphasis on the language of plausibility,
commentators have attempted to sort out what precisely is required
under a “plausibility pleading” standard. The Twombly holding has
been described as a “dramatic departure from settled procedural
law,”79 “dubious,”80 “poorly crafted,”81 and “troublesome.”82 The Iqbal
Court itself acknowledged that “[d]etermining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”83 
The exact meaning of “plausible” remains vague after Iqbal, as
does the meaning of the “facts” that plaintiffs must allege in order
to meet this standard.84 The Court, however, did emphasize that
plausible facts are those that suggest wrongdoing, not simply facts
that are “neutral,” that is, given to multiple interpretations or ex-
planations, some of which may suggest illegality, but some of which
describe ordinary and lawful behavior.85 Context proves to be
especially important in understanding the meaning of “neutrality.”86
78. Id. at 1950.
79. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Spencer, supra note 6, at 441-42.
81. Ides, supra note 66, at 606.
82. Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 889.
83. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
84. Professor Steinman, for example, takes care to distinguish the allegation of facts from
a requirement that a plaintiff “must identify evidentiary support for its allegations,” because
such a requirement at the pleadings stage “would contravene Rule 11 by mandating
immediate dismissal of a complaint without any opportunity ... to use discovery to obtain the
needed evidentiary support.” Steinman, supra note 38, at 40-41. Professor Thomas suggests
that Iqbal does require the plaintiff to plead additional facts, and that this requirement has
turned the motion to dismiss into a new motion for summary judgment. Thomas, supra note
66, at 18-21.
85. Both Twombly and Iqbal have been criticized on the grounds that the facts alleged in
each of the respective complaints were not as neutral as the Court chose to believe. See, e.g.,
Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 881-82; Spencer, supra note 6, at 447 (arguing that Twombly
“deprives plaintiffs the benefits of inferences in their favor when the pleaded facts are
consistent with alternate explanations that do not involve wrongdoing”).
86. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
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B. Twombly’s Role in Class Action Complaints
In certain complex litigation contexts, some are concerned that
pleadings should be examined with more suspicion than ordinary
complaints, and that complex litigation is almost always an
expensive prospect. Taken as one general concern about complex
litigation, rather than two distinct concerns that might apply to
some, but not all, forms of complex litigation,87 this position reflects
an over-simplified view of complex litigation. It also mirrors the
opinion in Twombly, which itself conflated the two distinct issues by
failing to adequately define the relationship between the plausibility
of facts in a complaint and the times that a court should be particu-
larly attentive to the costs of litigation. This confusion causes
problems when the Twombly/Iqbal standard is applied to class
action complaints.
Twombly and Iqbal envision claims that fall along a spectrum
from complete lack of knowledge of defendant activity to neutral
explanations of defendant activity, through plausibility, probability,
and then certainty. The crucial point in this continuum is the point
at which “neutral” allegations, from which both lawful and unlawful
conclusions may be inferred, require extra facts to show that the
conduct has moved away from a “baseline” of normal activity.88 The
Supreme Court alluded to this idea in both Twombly and Iqbal,
holding that the plaintiffs had “not ‘nudged [their] claims ... across
the line from conceivable to plausible.’”89 The Twombly/Iqbal stan-
dard is located somewhere along the spectrum between plausibility
and probability, most likely closer to the “plausible” marker.
87. See infra note 139.
88. Professor Bone theorized the baseline idea as: 
the normal state of affairs for situations of the same general type as those
described in the complaint. The probability of wrongdoing for baseline conduct
is not necessarily zero, but it should be very small, for otherwise the conduct in
question would not be part of a socially acceptable baseline. Understood in these
terms, what the Twombly Court requires are allegations that differ in some
significant way from what usually occurs in the baseline and differ in a way that
supports a higher probability of wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated with
baseline conduct. 
Bone, supra note 6, at 885-86. For Professor Spencer’s interpretation of the baseline, see
Spencer, supra note 6, at 448-50.
89. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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Class actions are different.90 The district court evaluates the
strength of the complaint as a class, rather than individually. The
plaintiff class stands or falls as a group based on the strength of
claims about the group itself. How, then, should a court make sense
of “speculativeness” in a lawsuit in which the named litigants are
responsible for pleading facts not only about themselves, but about
other persons for whom they do not or cannot have specific knowl-
edge? 
To answer this question, it is helpful to position class actions
along a spectrum of plaintiff behavior similar to that of defendant
behavior. The open question, however, is whether the Twombly/
Iqbal standard has a place on this spectrum as well.
If Twombly extends to all allegations in a complaint, then a court
may dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff has not alleged
sufficient facts to plausibly suggest the defendant has engaged in
unlawful activity.91 In an ordinary lawsuit, the relationship between
the plaintiff and the complaint is simple; each plaintiff pleads her
own cause of action—she is not a representative of anyone else.92
Even when multiple plaintiffs are joined as necessary93 or permis-
sive94 parties in one complaint, there is always a direct one-to-one
relationship between plaintiff and pleading. In other words, each
plaintiff must meet her own procedural burdens—she cannot ride





90. Twombly, of course, was itself a class action complaint. I address this aspect of the
decision infra in Part II.B.
91. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
92. In limited circumstances, a party can sue as the representative of another person. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1), (c).
93. Id. 19(a)(1).
94. Id. 20(a)(1).
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on the backs of other plaintiffs if their complaints are sufficient
when hers is not. There is a spectrum of speculativeness in com-
plaints, but the speculation runs to defendant or third-party
behavior only.
Extending Twombly to allegations of class members’ conduct
means that courts could envision a spectrum of class member
behavior similar to a spectrum of defendant behavior. 
This spectrum is explored in detail in Part III. For now, it is
sufficient to note that since class actions are subject to the same
plausibility requirements regarding defendant or third-party
behavior as in a normal lawsuit, the two spectra together form a
matrix.




of class member activity
Twombly/Iqbal?
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Given this complexity, this Article analyzes each axis of the
spectrum independently to determine the zone of permissible
pleadings in complex litigation cases. 
C. The Improper Use of Twombly and Iqbal in Class Certification
Proceedings
Before examining the relevance of the plausibility standard to
pleadings in complex litigation cases, it is important to disentangle
the application of the plausibility standard to motions to dismiss
(Twombly’s proper context) from an improper application of the
standard to the class certification context.
Using the Twombly/Iqbal standard in class certification would
require applying the plausibility standard to the facts surrounding
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class membership. In other words, under this interpretation,
Twombly would require a plaintiff suing as a named representative
on behalf of a putative class to plead facts that plausibly suggest the
existence of the class.95 
The intuition to apply the plausibility standard to motions beyond
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, such as a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, has already found its
way into judicial decisions and academic commentary.96 The
possibility of general applicability of the plausibility standard to
non-12(b)(6) motions is beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear,
however, that the plausibility pleading standard does not apply
directly to class certification under Rule 23. 
Pleadings are directly connected to Rule 12(b)(6) motions because
that rule governs dismissals based on whether the plaintiff has a
stated a claim for which relief can be granted.97 The Twombly and
Iqbal holdings, in turn, address whether the pleadings, as the basis
for a 12(b)(6) dismissal, are plausible. Rule 23 class certification, on
the other hand, does not directly relate to the pleadings filed in a
lawsuit because the formation of a plaintiff class is not itself a cause
of action or a claim for which relief can be granted. As the Supreme
Court has said, “In determining the propriety of a class action, the
question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause
of action ... but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are
met.”98 
Complaints alleging the existence of a class occupy a peculiar
place in pleadings jurisprudence. A request for class certification is
not part of a cause of action;99 thus, an individual plaintiff could
95. This issue is distinct from the question of whether the named representative or class
members actually have stated a cause of action. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
96. Commentators have suggested similar applications of Twombly beyond the Rule
12(b)(6) context, such as in the procedures governing decisions about personal jurisdiction. See
Jayne Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
98. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int’l,
452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971)).
99. This fact provoked skeptical reactions from several of my commentators. Because most
complaints in class action lawsuits do contain allegations of the existence of a class, many
readers may be surprised to learn that class allegations are not a technical requirement of a
class action complaint. Some civil procedure treatises assert (without support) that: 
The class representative’s complaint contains all the elements of any complaint
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theoretically bring any class action complaint.100 Some recent class
action scholarship emphasizes the role that the class as an entity
plays in adjudicating certain types of claims, such as employment
discrimination claims or securities class actions, highlighting the
centrality of aggregate proof or aggregate recovery in such law-
suits.101 The fact remains that a plaintiff does not need a class to
state a cause of action.
Framing the lawsuit as a class action in the complaint is a com-
mon practice, but not a legal necessity. Although courts occasionally
employ language indicating that class actions must be stated in the
complaint,102 inclusion of Rule 23 elements in a complaint is not
strictly necessary; however, Rule 23 does instruct the district court
to rule on the issue of class certification at “an early practicable
time” in the lawsuit.103
A district court can decide the issue of class certification in a
number of procedural contexts. The plaintiff may move for certifica-
tion under Rule 23 at the outset of the lawsuit.104 Alternatively, the
under Rule 8(a). In addition, she alleges that the case is brought as a class
action, and usually states that she is suing “on behalf of a class of persons (or
entities) similarly situated.” In the complaint, the representative will define the
class. 
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 732-33 (2d ed. 2009); see also GENE R. SHREVE & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 309 (4th ed. 2009) (“[The plaintiff] pleads
an individual claim, but also pleads the existence of a class.”). As the research and case law
of this section demonstrate, however, there is no technical requirement that when a class
action is filed in federal court the complaint itself contain allegations about the existence of
the class. It is, perhaps, the additional pressure that Twombly and Iqbal place on motions to
dismiss that forces a clarification of the differences between the requirements for a class
action and the requirements for a complaint, regardless of the form of the action brought.
100. Some scholars have argued, however, that there is a substantive legal difference
between mass torts and ordinary tort actions. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class
As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 929-31 (1998).
101. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (2009) (defining a role for aggregate proof in class certification and
merits determination).
102. See, e.g., Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1976) (“To maintain a class
action, the existence of the class must be pleaded.”); Danner v. Philips Petroleum Co., 447
F.2d 159, 164 n.10 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[C]lass action relief must be predicated upon a proper
class action complaint satisfying all the requirements of Rule 23.”).
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
104. In fact, a plaintiff may move for class certification well into the lawsuit, even years
after the initial complaint has been filed. A motion made after trial, however, is probably too
late. See, e.g., Lusted v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 817, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1984)
(affirming denial of class certification when motion was made after individual plaintiff won
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defendants can move for an order denying class certification,105 or
the court can raise the issue sua sponte,106 but courts should not rule
on it without proper briefing or argument from the parties.107
Although named plaintiffs often include class action elements in
pleadings, it is inaccurate to say that either the Federal Rules or
case law mandate the inclusion of class action elements as a part of
the “short and plain statement of a claim for relief ” in a Rule 8(a)(2)
pleading.108 Accordingly, district judges cautiously avoid deciding
issues pertaining to class certification in the context of a motion to
dismiss.109 Since language indicating the existence of a class or a
request for class certification need not be included in the complaint
at all, it would be quite strange for courts to insist on the inclusion
of facts that plausibly suggest there is a class action, when even
conclusory statements to that effect are not required. 
a favorable judgment at trial). Some courts have even upheld the existence of a class when
it was never formalized under Rule 23. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 1049 (11th Cir.
2001); Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (1st Cir. 1991); Senter v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1976); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485
F.2d 441, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court, however, has rejected in dicta the idea
of “implied class certification,” and remaining circuit courts are suspicious of procedures
outside of Rule 23. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976);
Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2003); Nance v. Union Carbide Corp.
Consumer Prods. Div., 540 F.2d 718, 724 (4th Cir. 1976).
105. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 198 F.R.D. 374, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“Before a plaintiff moves for class certification, a defendant may ‘test the propriety of the
action’ by a motion for denial of class certification.” (quoting Brown v. Milwaukee Spring Co.,
82 F.R.D. 103, 104 (E.D. Wis. 1979))), vacated on other grounds, 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003).
106. See Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1235 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Although a motion for
certification has not been made, the court will exercise the power given it by Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1) to certify class actions ‘as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action.’”).
107. See, e.g., Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 382 (6th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he trial court’s sua
sponte action ... in certifying the proceeding as a class action constituted error, particularly
under circumstances where those issues were not joined by the complaint nor developed by
the proof.”).
108. As the Third Circuit observed in demanding proof of class certification elements, “the
requirements set out in Rule 23 are not mere pleading rules.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249
F.3d 672, 675-77 (7th Cir. 2001)).
109. See, e.g., In re Jamster Mktg. Litig., No. 05CV0819, 2009 WL 1456632, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
May 22, 2009) (declining to decide issue of whether to include potential class members from
states that enforce nonclass action arbitration agreements in an opinion about a motion to
dismiss).
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The procedural differences between a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dis-
miss and a Rule 23 certification proceeding also indicate that there
would be some practical problems in applying the Twombly/Iqbal
standard in the class certification context. Namely, to what docu-
ments would the standard apply? This is more than just a
technicality—the fluidity of class certification procedures allows
judges maximum discretion to direct a briefing or discovery schedule
and manage the proceedings. Such flexibility is incompatible with
the Twombly directive to make an early and definitive conclusion
about the plausibility of a claim.
The conclusion that the plausibility standard applies to motions
to dismiss a class action complaint but not to a motion to grant or
deny class certification may seem simple, but as we shall see, a few
courts have already succumbed to the temptation to use the
plausibility standard to cut short the class certification process.110
While some confusion is understandable given the close relationship
between the Rule 23 requirements for certification and the underly-
ing merits of the lawsuit,111 limiting the application of Twombly and
Iqbal to their proper Rule 8(a) and 12(b)(6) contexts is critical to
achieving a balance between the benefits of a gatekeeping rule and
the dangers of process that blocks meritorious lawsuits from
proceeding. Therefore, the remainder of this Article is dedicated to
the issues that arise when Twombly and Iqbal are employed in
motions to dismiss class actions and other complex cases. 
II. POST-TWOMBLY PLEADINGS OF ALLEGATIONS OF DEFENDANT
CONDUCT IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
A. Targeting Class Action Complaints Under Twombly’s Cost of
Litigation Rationale
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions have left judges and commenta-
tors to sort out the precise meaning of “plausibility pleading.” Most
problems regarding the determination of the meaning of “plausibil-
ity” as applied to defendant conduct are common to all lawsuits,
both ordinary and complex. The aspect of Twombly that presents a
110. See infra Part II.C.
111. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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problem unique to complex litigation is the “cost of litigation” prong
of the decision because there is some indication that judges might
single out class action complaints for “heightened pleading”
evaluation simply on the basis that class actions raise the red flag
of high discovery costs.
While the amount of factual detail necessary to “nudge” a com-
plaint over the line from neutral to plausible is a central feature of
the Twombly/Iqbal standard,112 concentrating on the level of detail
in and of itself does not capture the full scope of Twombly’s effect on
the Twombly/Iqbal standard. The Court repeatedly referred to the
costs of litigation, especially the purportedly high cost of discovery
in antitrust class actions, as a factor in turning an increasingly
critical eye to the factual sufficiency of the pleadings.113 This aspect
of the Twombly opinion suggests that courts should look not only to
the plausibility of the allegations in the complaint, but also the
relationship between the plausibility of the allegations and the cost
of discovery.114 The higher the cost of litigation, in other words, the
more plausibility the court ought to demand from a complaint.115
The Court devoted significant attention in the Twombly opinion
to the role that the cost of litigation should have in adjudicating the
sufficiency of a pleading;116 this aspect of the decision, as setting a
standard in its own right, has received relatively scant attention
from the academy.117 It is probably the case, however, that the
decision has opened the door to a cost/benefit analysis in pleading
just as it has authorized some form of plausibility pleading, and that
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
114. See Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 16 (“[I]t would not be unreasonable for lower courts
to rule that the Twombly plausibility standard is limited to complex cases or cases where the
projected costs of discovery are high and the allegations of wrongdoing thin.”). Cavanagh,
writing shortly after the Twombly decision, suggested that lower courts have not in fact
limited their application of the plausibility standard in this way, but my analysis of some
lower cases below shows otherwise. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
115. Whether Rule 8(a)(2) can or should require tying the amount of information sought
through discovery to the cost of acquiring that information prior to summary judgment and
trial is beyond the scope of this Article. It is not obvious, however, that courts may fairly
interpret Rule 8(a)(2) to mean that pleading serves a “gatekeeping” function. See Bone, supra
note 6, at 898.
116. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-60 (2007).
117. See Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 882 (observing that the cost of litigation aspect of
Twombly has been “lost” in the post-Twombly debates).
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this cost/benefit analysis has particular salience in the complex
litigation arena.118
By noting that discovery costs were high in comparison to the
plausibility of the allegations in the complaint, lower courts have
already begun to use the cost of litigation aspect of Twombly to
justify the application of a heightened pleading standard.119 For
example, one district court dismissed an antitrust claim based on
the assertion that, without pleading specific facts, the “plaintiffs
antitrust claim should not be permitted to continue into ‘its
inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase.’”120 Other cases
similarly rely upon the assumption that, without “insisting on
specificity in antitrust pleadings,” defendants would be exposed “to
potentially massive factual discovery costs.”121
One judge, in trying to portray the use of such cost/benefit
analysis as consistent with pre-Twombly Supreme Court jurispru-
dence,122 found that the Court in Swierkowicz and Leatherman
118. See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 113 (2009)
(“In defense of Conley’s ‘retirement,’ Justice Souter flirted with but did not fully endorse an
economic theory of pleading.”).
119. Some lower courts had used this type of cost/benefit analysis even before the Twombly
decision. See Fairman, supra note 7, at 1014. For example, after Judge Posner dismissed an
antitrust action citing “[t]he heavy costs of modern federal litigation, especially antitrust
litigation” as grounds for requiring greater factual specificity in the complaint, Sutliff, Inc. v.
Donovan Cos., Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984), several courts quoted this language
with approval. See Warner Lambert Co. v. Purepac Pharm. Co., No. CIV.A. 98-02749 (JCL),
2000 WL 34213890, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2000); Garshman v. Universal Res. Holding, Inc.,
641 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D.N.J. 1986); see also Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 1988) (dismissing pleading as factually insufficient because
“litigation today is too expensive a process to waste time on fanciful claims”); Car Carriers,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (“When the requisite elements are
lacking, the costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the
federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable
likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.”);
Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318, 328 (D.N.J. 1999); Arbitron Co.
v. Tropicana Prod. Sales, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 3697, 1993 WL 138965, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28,
1993).
120. Westerfield v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 840, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2007)
(citing Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
121. See, e.g., CBCInnovis v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 2:06-CV-654, 2008 WL 320147,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2008). This case was actually dismissed based on the fact that the
plaintiffs had not alleged an antitrust injury and therefore lacked antitrust standing. Id. at
*8.
122. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 590 F. Supp. 2d 970 (M.D.
Tenn. 2008).
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“apparently determined that the importance of the causes of action
outweighed the costs of discovery and potential for frivolous
suits.”123 It was not a large leap, then, for the district judge to hold
that Twombly required “a reviewing court [to] take into consider-
ation the costs of permitting a fishing expedition in discovery,”124
even though the “fishing expedition” metaphor found its critics even
before the Twombly decision.125
Twombly calls upon judges to account for the cost of litigation
when assessing the plausibility of a pleading. To say that district
judges should consider the “costs of litigation,” however, is to give
little direction to the trial judge attempting to balance these two
factors, and the Court has said little to assist judges in this task.126
A closer examination of which costs a judge may include in the
calculation is necessary.127
The cost of discovery is the clearest example of a litigation cost
that a court may consider under Twombly. The Court cautioned that
“proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive” and quoted with
approval Judge Posner’s admonition that “some threshold of plaus-
ibility must be crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case
should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted
discovery phase.”128 The citations that the Court used to show the
high cost of litigation almost exclusively focus on discovery costs129
123. Id. at 974.
124. Id.; see also Smith v. Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuius, P.C., No. 07-5139, 2008 WL
2885887, at *5 (D.N.J. July 23, 2008) (holding that “[d]iscovery should not serve as a fishing
expedition during which Plaintiff searches for evidence in support of facts he has not yet
pleaded”). 
125. See generally Elizabeth Thornburg, Just Say “No Fishing”: The Lure of Metaphor, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006) (criticizing the use of “fishing expedition” for pleadings and
discovery requests as using a metaphor to replace actual analysis and perpetuating bias
against certain types of lawsuits and discovery requests).
126. See Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 22 (“The Court gives short shrift to any argument
that baseless claims in federal court can be eliminated by careful case management, control
of discovery, summary judgment, or carefully crafted jury instructions.”).
127. Professor Spencer identified three distinct parts of the Court’s “cost of litigation”
analysis: high costs of discovery, discovery abuse, and heavy judicial caseloads. Spencer, supra
note 6, at 452-53.
128. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (quoting Asahi Glass Co. v.
Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by
designation)).
129. Id. at 559 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 30 (2004) (“describing
extensive scope of discovery in antitrust cases”); Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair,
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and discovery abuse.130 The Court expressly cited discovery abuse
and the alleged inability of judges to control discovery as reasons to
insist on heightened pleading when the costs of discovery are
high.131
In emphasizing the cost of discovery, the Twombly Court recog-
nized the most familiar litigation costs. Critics of complex litigation,
however, have yet another target: the cost to defendants of settling
frivolous or meritless suits. A judge eager to dismiss a complaint
that falls on the thinner side of factual detail might want to make
the cost of proceeding with litigation as high as possible. One way
to do this is to include the cost of settlement, that is, the actual
dollar amount paid to a plaintiff group or class, as a cost of litiga-
tion. It is not clear that the Twombly opinion goes this far. At one
point, the Court warns of “cost-conscious defendants” who might
“settle even anemic cases,”132 but even this worry, however, is tied
directly to “the threat of discovery expense.”133 Presumably, the
Court would not approve of dismissing a similar case with average
discovery costs simply because trials are expensive or the defendant
is risk averse.134 Furthermore, if this were true, then the strength
of the plaintiffs’ claim would be tied to the size of the requested
damages, a conclusion even more troubling than tying the strength
of the plaintiffs’ claim to the cost of discovery. 
The criticisms of the cost of litigation rationale are directed, in
large part, toward the fact that these concerns would be better
addressed through a congressional amendment of Rule 8 or the
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000) (“reporting that discovery accounts
for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs when discovery is actively employed”)).
130. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting
on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898-99 (2003)).
131. Id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638
(1989)). Professor Cavanagh has criticized this aspect of the opinion for relying too heavily on
the Easterbrook article, stating that the assertions are “contrary to fact” and do not account
for recent innovations in the tools that judges have at their disposal to control discovery.
Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 879, 882-89. One passage from which the Court quotes
extensively reads more like a rant against the adversarial system itself (in which the judge
has little control over the claims) than against discovery abuse. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6.
132. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
133. Id.
134. See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 13-68
(2003).
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discovery rules,135 or that these problems, especially the specter of
discovery abuse, are not meaningfully related to notice of the
lawsuit or its meritoriousness.136
Although Iqbal was not a class action, the Court took care to
reaffirm the cost of litigation rationale in the opinion.137 Iqbal adds
two elements to the cost of litigation analysis. First, it signals the
Court’s willingness to apply the rationale outside the context of
large, complex litigation. Perhaps this is disheartening from the
perspective of those hoping that the cost of litigation rationale, a
flawed and unfounded aspect of Rule 8 interpretation, would fade
into the background. The Court’s willingness to apply the rationale
in other contexts shows, however, that judges ought to be making
such investigations on a case-by-case basis, rather than assuming
that all cases of a certain type are or are not the source of high
discovery costs. This argument becomes important in trying to
distinguish those class actions that are, in fact, not the source of
unusually high discovery costs vis-à-vis other cases.138 
Second, Iqbal introduces the idea that a cost of litigation can be
something beyond mere monetary outlays. The concern in Iqbal was
not only that discovery would be expensive, although the Court
intimated that this was indeed a concern, but that discovery
involving government officials entitled to a defense of qualified
immunity would unacceptably disrupt their duties.139 Those critics
who view Iqbal as a doctrine that hinders citizen investigation into
possible government malfeasance140 are rightfully distressed by such
reasoning. This part of the opinion, however, like the Court’s will-
ingness to examine the cost of litigation outside of the complex
135. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 38 (“The bone this Article picks with the Court is
not that it took the wrong path for pleading, but that it blazed a new and unclear path alone
and without adequate warning or thought.”); Stephen Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial:
Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 150
(2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=24 (“In initiating change through
its power to decide cases and controversies, however, the Court lacked the information and
diverse perspectives that the rulemaking process affords.”).
136. See Spencer, supra note 6, at 453-54.
137. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
138. See infra Part II.B.
139. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
140. See, e.g., Michelle Spiegel, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Question of a Heightened Standard
of Pleading in Qualified Immunity Cases, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 388 (2009).
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litigation context, introduces a further element of nuance into any
court’s investigation of the “costs of litigation.” If a nonmonetary
cost like disruption of government officials’ duties is a cost, then
perhaps nonmonetary benefits like deterrence of defendant conduct
or prosecution of wrong-doing may also be used to demonstrate the
overall value of proceeding with litigation.
B. Scrutinizing Allegations of Defendant Conduct in Class Action
Complaints
In this Section I argue that, although courts may be justified in
requiring a higher degree of plausibility in actions when the cost of
litigation is high, it is a mistake to use the label “class action” as a
proxy for “high cost of litigation.” The Iqbal decision clarifies that
the Twombly standard’s application is not limited to complex
cases.141 
There is still a risk, however, that judges will read Twombly to
apply specially or almost automatically to complex cases because of
the emphasis on the dangers of high cost litigation—a danger often
assumed to be present in complex cases.142 Painting with such a
broad brush fails to differentiate class actions from other potentially
costly types of litigation and to differentiate among types of class
actions. This approach also fails to account for the efficiencies that
class actions are, themselves, supposed to create.
The size of the plaintiff class matters only in that it affects the
dollar amount of a judgment or settlement. The settlement or
judgment amount does not qualify as a cost of discovery. It also
141. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953; see also Bone, supra note 6, at 887 n.70 (arguing that
suggestions that the Twombly standard applies only to complex cases “fit[ ] the language of
Twombly rather poorly”); Douglas A. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063,
1084 (2009) (describing that limitation as “an imprecise oversimplification of the Twombly
approach”).
142. This fear is not limited to class actions or aggregated cases, as courts have identified
single plaintiff cases as “complex” and potentially costly for the purposes of requiring
heightened pleading. See Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Twombly “teaches that a defendant should not be burdened with the heavy costs of pretrial
discovery that are likely to be incurred in a complex case unless the complaint indicates that
the plaintiff’s case is a substantial one”). However, because class actions frequently are
equated with complexity, this Part focuses on the danger of using “class action” as a stand-in
for complex or costly litigation.
2010] THE PLAINTIFF NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE 2029
would be incorrect to classify the cost to the defendant of paying out
a settlement or judgment as a “cost of litigation.” While these sums
are part of the cost of a lawsuit, they are not part of the cost of
moving through the process of the lawsuit. In other words, the size
of a plaintiff class is, by itself, an insufficient basis for concluding
that the costs of discovery, or even the costs of litigation more
broadly, are high. 
A cost of litigation analysis that accounts for the existence or size
of a plaintiff class should include four factors: (1) a determination of
whether the size of the plaintiff class increases the cost of discovery
at all, (2) whether an increase in the cost of discovery due to
additional plaintiffs is related to the question of whether the
plaintiffs have stated a claim, (3) an examination of whether the
defendants will bear a significant portion of the costs of this “extra”
discovery, and (4) an evaluation of the magnitude of increased
discovery costs in relation to the efficiencies of consolidated
litigation.
1. Size of the Plaintiff Class
The first factor is to determine whether the number of plaintiffs
is indeed the cause of higher discovery costs. In some situations, the
size of the plaintiff class has little or no impact on the cost of
discovery. Twombly itself is an example of such a case, but the
opinion reinforces a common perception about class actions: the
larger the plaintiff class, the more expensive the case will be to
litigate.143 Justice Souter worried that one cause of the “potential
expense” was that “plaintiffs represent[ed] a putative class of at
least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or high-speed
Internet service in the continental United States.”144 The intended
inference was that with every member of the plaintiff class, the cost
of discovery would increase. 
There is, however, no reason to believe that the size of the
plaintiff class drives up discovery costs in an antitrust action based
on allegations of horizontal conspiracy like Twombly. As the Court
itself observed, discovery in Twombly could be expensive because of
143. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
144. Id. 
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the documents from “America’s largest telecommunications firms
(with many thousands of employees generating reams and gigabytes
of business records).”145 If evidence of the alleged conspiracy is found
in the defendants’ business records and communications, then
discovery should be more or less the same whether there is one
plaintiff or one million.146 
Although the size of the plaintiff class in actions like Twombly
does not affect the cost of discovery, there are some situations in
which the size of the plaintiff class may be indirectly tied to the size
and cost of discovery. For example, suppose a Hispanic woman who
works for a large national retailer files an employment discrimina-
tion class action on behalf of other Hispanic women, alleging that a
company-wide policy resulted in discriminatory promotional
practices at the company’s retail outlets throughout the nation. In
such a lawsuit, discovery for a nationwide class will increase in
relationship to the number of regions, managerial centers, and
stores that the plaintiffs will investigate. A higher number of class
members thus corresponds to a larger amount of discovery insofar
as the larger number of class members implicates a larger number
of locations and decision makers.147 
Some class actions do in fact require plaintiff specific discovery;
in other words, the addition of each individual or subclass requires
discovery beyond what is needed if there is only one plaintiff. This
is often the case in class actions when plaintiff injury or behavior
plays some role in the lawsuit.148 Although in these lawsuits the cost
of discovery is most closely tied to the size of the plaintiff class, Rule
23's mechanisms for prohibiting class action certification in suits
involving unwieldy individual issues will apply to such situations.149
145. Id.
146. Notice to class members is one possible aspect of class action litigation that often
requires discovery that is directly related to the size of the plaintiff class. This issue is
addressed infra in Part II.C in which I argue that Twombly may have an indirect impact on
the doctrines of class certification and notice.
147. This hypothetical is also instructive of the fact that large plaintiff class size alone is
an insufficient basis for concluding that discovery is “expensive” as it might be the case that
proceeding as a nationwide class is ultimately more efficient than piecemeal litigation. See
infra Part II.B.4.
148. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2009).
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (commonality requirement); id. 23(b)(3) (predominance
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The risk here is that judges will use plaintiff class size as a reason
to require a higher level of factual allegations in the complaint at
the Rule 12(b)(6) phase rather than allow the class certification
process to sort out situations when discovery of individual issues is
too complicated to justify the maintenance of a class action.
2. Relationship Between Any Increase in the Cost of Discovery
and Plaintiffs’ Ability To State a Claim
Although there are some situations in which a larger plaintiff
class does not necessarily correspond to a higher cost of discovery,
there is no question that in other situations a larger plaintiff class
results in higher discovery costs. The next step in discerning
whether these discovery costs justify stricter pleading at the motion
to dismiss stage is to determine whether the discovery costs are
linked to the question of whether the plaintiff class is entitled to
relief. There are several expenses associated with class action
litigation that involve discovery but do not directly implicate the
existence of a cause of action.
One expensive aspect of class action discovery relates to the
requirement of giving reasonable notice and opt out opportunities
to potential class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The
named representatives are responsible for preparing and sending
notice to potential class members.150 This process is not, however,
without cost to the defendants. Defendants are often the parties in
possession of the records and materials used to generate the list of
potential class members, and a district judge may use his discretion
to allocate these costs to the defendant.151 
Another potentially expensive facet of class actions concerns
damages and the nature or amount of relief to which class members
are entitled. These costs may manifest themselves as discovery
costs, or they might appear later in the litigation as costs associated
requirement for 23(b)(3) actions).
150. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
151. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350 (1978) (“[W]here a defendant
can perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice ... more efficiently than the
representative plaintiff, the district court has discretion to order him to perform the task
under Rule 23(d).”).
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with administering an award or settlement to members of the
class.152
Courts should not understand such costs as “expensive discovery”
for Twombly purposes because neither endeavor helps the court and
parties determine if the plaintiffs are entitled to relief. Instead,
these discovery efforts aid the parties in administering the lawsuit.
These litigation expenses should not factor into any Twombly
cost/benefit analysis, but these two examples should not be read as
an exhaustive or rigid list. Rather, a court considering the possible
expenses presented by a class action should ask whether the
discovery in question is aimed at uncovering a basis on which relief
can be granted.
This limitation stems from the Court’s reasoning in Twombly and
Iqbal which expressed concern with the cost of breathing life into
“anemic” claims.153 The Court’s central claim about the gatekeeping
function of pleading—that defendants should not be forced to defend
against allegations when there is little chance that any evidence of
wrongdoing actually will be found—is coupled with an intuition
about the fairness of the costs involved.154 In other words, defen-
dants should not have to pay for the plaintiffs to search for basic
elements of a cause of action. The cases do not say, however, that
defendants can demand higher proof from the plaintiffs at the
outset just because the overall cost of litigating might be high.
An application of the Twombly/Iqbal standard in this way would
be to use it as a tool to disfavor actions that are administratively
expensive outside of the question of whether a cause of action exists.
Direct regulation of the litigation tasks and expenses associated
with these lawsuits is the usual suggestion for ameliorating these
problems.155 Without dismissing that approach,156 it is not unreason-
able to envision a role for gatekeeping in the quest to avoid lawsuits
152. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed?: The Economics of Pleading
and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 61 (2008).
153. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
154. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007).
155. See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 59-60 (1997).
156. One should note, however, that repeated calls for managing the costs of discovery by
amending the discovery rules themselves rarely result in meaningful change. See Lee H.
Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 167, 191 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/82.pdf.
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with high administrative costs. But a generalized plausibility
pleading standard like that in Twombly is an inappropriate mech-
anism for regulating lawsuits with high administrative expenses.
However, Congress might identify particular causes of action that,
when brought as class actions, tend to generate high costs of
litigation and require a higher pleading standard. 
The PSLRA, for example, requires particularized pleading of
certain elements in a securities class action.157 There, Congress was
concerned about a specific type of allegation made in the context of
a specific type of class action.158 Assuming that regulation in the
securities class action context is substantively necessary, it is this
sort of targeted regulation that is preferable to the use of a general-
ized heightened pleading standard to address all costs of complex
litigation without regard to their underlying source.
A final source of confusion regarding the difference between the
overall costs of complex litigation and costs associated with un-
covering the existence of a cause of action is the fear that class
actions are more expensive than normal actions because they entail
higher agency costs of class representation. To the extent that these
increased costs would be used to demand heightened pleading from
class action plaintiffs, this fear is misplaced.
The agency problem in class action litigation rests on the gap
between the class lawyers and unnamed class members. At its
worst, agency problems are blamed for actions in which plaintiffs’
lawyers walk away with hefty fees from a favorable settlement or
judgment whereas plaintiffs recoup little, if any, of the award.159 The
scope, causes, and possible solutions to this problem have been
explored extensively in class action literature.160 The important
157. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s Obligation To Ensure Adequate
Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 512-13 (2006) (noting the agency
problem but arguing that most cases of high attorney awards and low class member recovery
are the result of collusion between counsel for plaintiff and defendant or poor court oversight);
Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of Class
Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1345-48 (2005) (summarizing class action settlements
in which attorneys earned high fees and consumers were awarded coupons, often of dubious
value).
160. See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation
of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 208-27 (2004); John C.
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point here is that any extra expense that agency costs add to class
action litigation is unrelated to the question of the existence of a
cause of action161 and therefore should not be factored into the price
of a lawsuit in which plaintiffs must allege more facts than in a case
in which such costs do not exist.
3. Who Bears the Cost of Discovery?
The third factor is to examine the extent to which either the
plaintiffs, the defendants, or both parties will bear a significant
amount of the cost of plaintiff-related discovery. In most situations,
the costs of producing discoverable materials fall on the party from
whom such materials are requested.162 This does not mean, however,
that discovery is costless to the other party—they still must bear
discovery costs such as the expenses involved in reviewing docu-
ments or taking depositions.163 An assessment of this factor need not
establish exact dollar amounts or determine which party must pay
more. Rather, the analysis should focus on the relationship between
the costs and the parties who bear them.164
First, if the defendants bear a significant portion of the costs of
this sort of discovery, then it is appropriate for a court to consider
whether this extra expense supports Twombly’s apprehension of
rising costs. The Twombly Court framed this in terms of two related
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action:
Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 519; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 341-42; Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search
for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765
(1998); Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 305-06 (1996);
Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2056-58
(1995); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV.
571, 572-73 (1997).
161. See Bassett, supra note 159, at 515 (stating that adequate representation, not cost,
is relevant to the existence of an action).
162. See Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (recognizing the
presumption that the responding party pays the costs of production).
163. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 451, 455-56 (1994).
164. Bone, supra note 6, at 928-30 (discussing “incentive-shaping rules”).
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concerns. One is a general discomfort with the fairness of the
expenses themselves; the Court intimated that defendant payment
of discovery expenses itself is unjust when there is little reason to
believe that a claim exists.165 The other worry is that high discovery
costs will pressure defendants into settling “anemic” claims.166
Under either reading, the Court’s concern was for defendant
discovery costs, not discovery costs in general. 
To the extent that the Court evinced a concern for the cost to the
court, those costs can be separated from the costs of conducting
discovery itself. In such instances, the so-called “fishing expedition”
for the existence of a claim is not present. Class action litigants
should not be uniquely punished because other aspects of the
litigation could be costly. The costs to the court more heavily fall in
the area of motion practice and trial.167 Discovery is perhaps the
least judicially intensive phase of a lawsuit, as it is conducted
largely outside of the presence of the judge.168
Beyond Twombly’s doctrinal reasons to consider the source of the
cost of discovery, plaintiffs show more confidence in their claims
when they must bear a greater portion of the discovery costs.
Contrast the portrayal of discovery in a case like Twombly, in which
lopsided costs would fall on the defendants with the plaintiffs
merely bearing the costs of reviewing documents produced by the
defendants,169 with discovery in cases when the plaintiffs must
produce information about their actions or conditions, or rely on the
reports of handsomely paid experts. In fact, “the available data
suggest that most pretrial costs are either roughly equal as to
plaintiffs and defendants, or that they favor defendants rather than
plaintiffs.”170
165. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
166. Id. at 559.
167. See D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 875, 876 (2006).
168. Caroline Harris Crowne, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing
a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768, 1781 (2001).
169. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-49, 559.
170. Stancil, supra note 118, at 124. Stancil identifies certain classes of cases as “high risk,”
and thus warranting a stricter pleading standard. Id. at 128-30, 146-48. Such categories,
however, are derived from understanding the underlying claim or cause of action at issue, and
he does not suggest that the category “class action” is a meaningful predictor of high risk
cases. Furthermore, Stancil observes that claims in which defendants are more likely to bear
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Such discovery is less likely to be a “fishing expedition” in which
plaintiffs search for the claim itself.171 Plaintiff discovery, in other
words, requires plaintiffs to “put their money where their mouths
are” and is unlikely to result in the expensive and open-ended
searching that so bothered the Court in Twombly.172
Examining plaintiffs’ discovery costs relative to those of defen-
dants therefore defeats the idea, implicit in the Twombly opinion,
that the undifferentiated category of “cost of discovery” is either an
indicator or result of meritless claims. The available data demon-
strate that expenses borne by plaintiffs are a significant part of
pretrial litigation costs, and that this is true even for some types of
claims that are the frequent subject of class action lawsuits.173 Once
one accepts the fact that, in most cases, plaintiffs’ pretrial costs are
nontrivial, economic modeling of litigant behavior suggests that
plaintiffs’ pretrial litigation costs are a meaningful constraint on a
plaintiff’s willingness to file a meritless claim.174 
Economists and other scholars utilizing game theory to model
litigant behavior disagree on the details of manner and strength of
these constraints. All models, however, are inconsistent with the
a large share of discovery expenses are the same cases in which there is a higher risk of Type
II error (erroneous dismissal of meritorious claims). Id. at 146. This conclusion is consistent
with an oft-repeated critique of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, that the cases most likely
to be dismissed for lack of plausibility are the ones in which plaintiffs are the most in need
of court assisted discovery.
171. See, e.g., id. at 147.
172. Id. at 126 (“[T]he risk of cost arbitrage increases as the plaintiff’s internal pretrial
costs of litigation decrease relative to the defendant’s.”).
173. Id. at 127 (“According to a 1988 Rand study, the cost disparity actually favored
defendants for aviation accident claims; defendants paid an average of $49,000 to the
plaintiffs’ $72,000. And though a 1980s study of asbestos claims showed a small disparity
favoring plaintiffs, by the 1990s, that disparity had been reversed.” (citation omitted)).
174. BONE, supra note 134, at 45-50, 150-55; Hylton, supra note 152, at 47 (“[T]he plaintiff’s
prediction of prevailing ... is the best candidate to serve as a measure of the profit of the
typical lawsuit.”); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1985) (“Suppose for example that the
Plaintiff would have a 70 per cent chance of winning at trial; that the Judgment amount
would be $300; that his litigation costs would be $250; and that the defendant’s defense costs
would be $200. Then as the Plaintiff’s expected Judgment would be only $210, he would not
be willing to go to trial.”). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the
Credibility and Success of Threats To Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24 (1996) (“If the litigation
process in these cases is sufficiently divisible, this divisibility might by itself provide plaintiffs
with a credible threat, and it therefore might by itself provide the defendant with an
‘economic’ reason to pay.”).
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assertion that the presence of high discovery costs is synonymous
with a situation in which plaintiffs breeze through discovery at no
or little cost to themselves while imposing the entirety of the high
costs on defendants. The category of high discovery costs demands
attention to the allocation of expenses between plaintiffs and
defendants.
4. Whether the Class Action Promotes or Reduces Relevant
Efficiencies
Class actions and other consolidation devices have gained pop-
ularity for their perceived efficiencies. Over the past forty years,
class actions and other consolidation devices have grown in
popularity because many practitioners and commentators believed
that “[i]t is efficient to centralize cases in order to gain economies of
scale in decision making, avoid costly repetition of discovery, and
perhaps spur private settlement to resolve cases without further
expenditure of court resources.”175 Although commentators have
criticized some aspects of this conclusion,176 and Congress has
become somewhat wary of large aggregate cases,177 the enthusiasm
for consolidating cases on the grounds of judicial economy con-
tinues.178
175. Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2369, 2382 (2008); see also Robert A. Cahn, A Look at the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 211, 221 (1977); Issacharoff, supra note 160, at 363; Judith
Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 933-34 (1995)
(“Today's interest in class actions stems in part from a vision of them as efficient, particularly
in arenas like mass torts ... serv[ing] as a means of processing the expected high quantity of
claims that will be brought individually.”).
176. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 642-43 (1981) (describing jurisdictional
redundancy and its uses); see also Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction and Protective
Coordination: Lessons from the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 231-49
(2007) (questioning the value of an ex ante congressional decision to consolidate all claims
arising out of September 11 before a single judge in the Southern District of New York);
Lahav, supra note 175, at 2374-81 (arguing that there is value to some jurisdictional
redundancy in litigating complex cases).
177. See Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the
2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1944-49 (2008) (arguing that statutes such as CAFA show Congress’s
disfavor of aggregate actions in state courts).
178. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
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The class action suit is a procedural device that is supposed to
boost judicial economy. From the defendant’s perspective, it is
cheaper to litigate a claim in one or a small number of cases rather
than many times over.179 The consolidation of claims reduces the
number of redundant pretrial issues that must be resolved and
avoids the need to conduct redundant discovery exercises.180 The
class action is also efficient, if not vital, from the plaintiffs’ perspec-
tive. The classic 23(b)(3) class action scenario involves multiple
plaintiffs with small dollar value claims.181 No plaintiff would file an
individual suit,182 so the class action device takes multiple negative
value suits and turns them into a positive expected value suit.183
Notably, the plaintiffs’ perspective is not just about fairness and
giving plaintiffs a tool for pursuing a remedy; the device is thought
to remedy an inefficiency that results when defendants are insu-
lated from liability simply because no one plaintiff has the means or
incentive to sue.184 The resulting situation is inefficient because a
certain class of conduct goes undeterred,185 and the money that the
defendant does not pay out is a windfall, or unjust enrichment.186 
The question of efficiency of class action and aggregate litigation
has been heavily debated in the academy.187 Leading the charge
against claims of class action efficiency, John Coffee has argued that
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 99 (2000); Shapiro, supra note 100, at 928.
179. See Lahav, supra note 175, at 2382.
180. See id.
181. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980).
182. See id. (recognizing that individual plaintiffs are deterred from filing suits because of
the cost of litigation); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (observing that
in an action in which each plaintiff only claimed around seventy dollars, “[n]o competent
attorney would undertake [the plaintiff’s] action to recover so inconsequential an amount”).
183. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1991).
184. See Roper, 445 U.S. at 339.
185. See Ting v. AT & T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that a lack of
class action device “would serve to shield AT & T from liability even in cases where it has
violated the law”); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(noting that contractual clauses that preclude class actions give defendants “a license to push
the boundaries of good business practices to their furthest limits”).
186. Eastman v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., No. 01-1743, 2002 WL 1061856, at *3 (Wis.
Ct. App. May 29, 2002) (“Because each individual plaintiff suffered less than $200 actual
damage, the cost and inconvenience of separate actions would result in no recovery for most
plaintiffs and substantial unjust enrichment to Conseco.”).
187. For an overview of these debates, see BONE, supra note 134, at 259-98.
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conflicts of interest and asymmetric information lead to inefficient
settlements for both plaintiff class members and defendants.188
Others have countered that “the efficiencies of group litigation make
possible a higher level of investment in discovery and trial prepara-
tion.”189
This debate remains unresolved, with little empirical data to
support what are largely theoretical conclusions.190 Moreover,
arguments about the efficiency of class actions encompass far more
than the questions of procedural efficiency, attempting instead to
capture whether class actions are the best mechanism for promoting
other goals of private law enforcement such as deterrence, compen-
sation, and repose for defendants.191
There is no need to resolve the debate over class action efficiency
in this Article. The question of total efficiency of class actions is
misplaced192 when discussing whether class actions should be
188. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1384-421 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class
Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1995); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency
in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-917 (1987).
189. BONE, supra note 134, at 262 (citing Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377
(2000)); see also Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 61 (1975).
190. See Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995 BYU L. REV.
879, 897 (“[E]ven the most forceful justification for consolidation—judicial economy—may,
upon examination, prove to be an ambivalent one.”).
191. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of
Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2000) (proposing that class
action efficiency could be improved by the use of “either intervention or state parens patriae
litigation”); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 483-84 (1997) (suggesting a new framework that would promote the
interests of the class by removing distorted counsel incentives); Shapiro, supra note 100, at
928, 933 (“For the system itself, the ability to resolve a mass dispute in a single, consolidated
proceeding, while not without difficulties of management and control, offers distinct
advantages over the task of managing scores, or even thousands, of suits in state and/or
federal courts throughout the country.” (footnotes omitted)); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth
J. Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice
or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 92-99 (2004) (arguing that class
actions are an efficient means of enforcing consumer rights).
192. If the debate over class action efficiency is conclusively resolved in favor of limiting
class actions, then class actions themselves should be regulated, eliminating the need for a
generalized pleading rule of thumb that requires higher scrutiny of class action complaints
for facts about defendants’ conduct.
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singled out as a category for high discovery costs. Courts are justi-
fied in using the “cost of litigation prong” (if at all) to curb the
procedural costs of using class actions as a vehicle for litigation. The
question, then, is whether class actions lead to higher discovery
costs vis-à-vis other modes of litigation, such as litigating each case
individually. 
In most cases, consolidation of discovery proceedings into one case
will reduce, not raise, the cost of discovery.193 In cases of negative
value suits, there might be a temptation to argue that the cost of
discovery in the class action will always be higher because there is,
in effect, no realistic “individual suit” with which to compare dis-
covery costs. This, however, is a misplaced gripe with the use of
class actions to litigate negative value suits, and not a reason to
impose a higher pleading standard. In effect, by assuming that the
relevant cost comparison is between the class action lawsuit and no
lawsuits at all, higher pleading standards would be required for
these lawsuits simply because they exist. Making assumptions
about the costs of class actions is ironic because it relies on the same
conclusory statements unsupported by facts that a judge would
never tolerate in a complaint under Twombly itself.194
C. The Existence of the Second Gate
The four factors outlined above distinguish the costs of discovery
associated with determining whether there is a cause of action and
the costs of discovery (or even the case as a whole) associated with
other parts of litigation. This distinction serves to narrow the poten-
tial abuses in utilizing the plausibility standard as a gatekeeper by
identifying litigation costs that fall outside of the scope of Twombly. 
The fact, however, that certain costs of litigation should not be
included as part of a case-screening decision at the motion to
dismiss stage does not make these costs disappear. One possible
193. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1870 (1992) (“The benefits generally
attributed to class actions ... are ... the economies of shared discovery ... costs.”); Sarah S.
Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1643 (2006)
(concluding that consolidation will reduce litigation costs by “mitigat[ing] exposure to
overlapping discovery obligations”).
194. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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objection to my argument is that class actions and other complex
cases are unique procedural creations that require unique gatekeep-
ers. To the extent that this is true, critics should not forget that a
gatekeeping mechanism for class actions already exists, the class
certification process.195
Gatekeeping procedures are those that weed out, and thus end,
nonmeritorious lawsuits.196 Although Rule 23 class certification is
not technically a dispositive motion, it often functions as such.197 A
denial of certification does not mandate the dismissal of the
lawsuit.198 The reality of many 23(b)(3) class actions,199 however, is
that class certification has the same effect as a motion to dismiss
because individual plaintiffs would be unable or unwilling to main-
tain the lawsuit on their own.200 The rule drafters themselves
recognized this “death knell” principle in amending Rule 23 to allow
for interlocutory appeal of class certification decisions.201 A grant of
certification is also often the end of the lawsuit because, “with
vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation on
195. See Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to
Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1003 n.12 (2005) (“The certification decision
is therefore the pivotal moment in the life of a putative class action, with the judge acting as




199. Federal courts may certify three types of class actions, which are described in greater
detail. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
200. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir.
2001) (“[D]enying or granting class certification is often the defining moment in class actions
(for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part of the plaintiffs, or create
unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of the defendants).”); Blair
v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (“For some cases the denial
of class status sounds the death knell of the litigation, because the representative plaintiff's
claim is too small to justify the expense of litigation.”); see also 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14:6, at 571 n.61 (4th ed. 2002) (“Class actions also
may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually
... this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would
have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.” (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
809 (1985))).
201. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting
or denying class-action certification under this rule.”); see Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in
Whoville: Rule 23(f), a Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 103 (2001) (“[T]he Advisory
Committee Note conceptually resuscitates interlocutory appeals for both death-knell and
reverse-death-knell class certification orders.”).
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a path toward resolution by way of settlement,”202 and some class
actions are certified expressly for the purpose of settlement.203
Unlike the gatekeeping envisioned by proponents of a plausibility
standard, however, class certification is not a quick and clean
procedure. Discovery is a regular and often integral part of the pro-
ceedings.204 When plaintiffs move for class certification, or defen-
dants move for a denial of class certification, a court will consider
evidence and hear oral argument before ruling on the issue of
certification.205 The scope and cost of discovery on issues related to
class certification varies widely depending on the type of litigation
and the issues of class certification that the parties are contesting.206
District judges enjoy broad discretion over the scope of class certi-
fication discovery.207 
For this reason, class certification might be viewed as a subop-
timal case-screening mechanism for complex lawsuits. Although an
imperfect process, class certification is a superior gatekeeping
mechanism for considering the overall costs of litigating a complex
suit in comparison to the limited utility of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.
One of the most contested aspects of class certification discovery
is the extent to which it spills over into discovery of the merits of the
202. Nagareda, supra note 101, at 99; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (arguing that defendants “will be under intense pressure to settle”
when certification is granted in large products liability class actions); Robert G. Bone & David
S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1291 (2002)
(“[T]he vast majority of certified class actions settle, most soon after certification.”). But see
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1357, 1360 (2003) (refuting various forms of the “blackmail” thesis of class certification).
203. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-22 (1997)
(holding that a class action certified for purposes of settling a case must still meet the other
relevant Rule 23 requirements for certification).
204. See, e.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 202, at 1281.
205. See id.
206. See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 924 (noting that products liability actions require more factual
development than “typical mass torts” before class action certification can occur (internal
quotations omitted)).
207. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196,
204 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that “district courts retain ‘ample discretion’ to limit discovery” in
class certification proceedings (citing In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41
(2d Cir. 2006))); Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975).
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case itself.208 In 1974, the Supreme Court held that Rule 23
proceedings should not include preliminary inquiries into the merits
of the case.209 Even when faced with such a simplistic injunction,
and in the wake of Eisen, the lower courts have struggled with the
very same problems that now confront them in the pleading context:
how to conduct a meaningfully efficient gatekeeping proceeding
without sacrificing the nuance that a fact-based inquiry into the
merits can provide.210
It will not always be easy to separate the issue of class certifica-
tion from the question of whether the class as a whole has stated a
claim. However, when there is a question of whether the sufficiency
of class allegations should be tested by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss or a Rule 23 motion to grant or deny class certification, a
court should use the class certification procedure to ensure that
meritorious claims are not swept away by preliminary suspicions
concerning the existence of a class. Because class certification is
itself a threshold mechanism, eschewing a motion to dismiss in
favor of class certification does not open the door to full and
unlimited merits-based discovery.
While sometimes clunky, the class certification procedure does
provide a second gatekeeping point for evaluating the concerns
that drive many critics to label class actions as costly or difficult.211
Moreover, some of the requirements for certification, such as
commonality,212 superiority,213 and difficulties in managing the
action,214 directly address these concerns, allowing a judge to focus
on the content and consequences of specific costs of the litigation at
208. See John Randall Whaley et al., Precertification Discovery: A User’s Guide, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 1827, 1866-71 (2006) (discussing the merits of bifurcating discovery between “class
certification” issues and “merits” issues).
209. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (“We find nothing in either the
language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action.”).
210. See Whaley et al., supra note 208, at 1868 (citing two cases in which courts have
refused to bifurcate discovery out of concern for efficiency and inability to distinguish between
“class” discovery and “merit” discovery).
211. For a discussion of criticisms of class action suits on the basis of their high costs, see
supra Part II.A.
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
213. Id. 23(b)(3).
214. Id. 23(b)(3)(D).
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hand. Finally, because these costs do not pertain to the question of
whether the action is frivolous or meritless, the justification for the
quickest and earliest case-screening method possible evaporates.
Therefore, the existence of class certification as a middle-ground
“second gate” should not be forgotten when a court considers the
relevant costs of proceeding with a class action at the motion to
dismiss phase of a lawsuit. 
III. APPLYING THE TWOMBLY/IQBAL STANDARD TO ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAINTIFF, GROUP PLAINTIFF, AND CLASS CONDUCT
The debates surrounding the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard
focus on the plaintiff’s quest to uncover information about suspected
wrongdoing by the defendants they are suing.215 Pleadings some-
times lack factual detail because the plaintiff does not have access
to information about the defendant’s conduct or motivations.216
Consequently, much of the debate over the soundness of the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions has centered around the fairness of
requiring the plaintiff to possess this sort of information before
filing a lawsuit.217 
When one views the plausibility standard from this perspective,
it might sound strange to speak of plaintiffs “speculating” about
their own behavior. After all, plaintiffs do not need judicially super-
vised discovery to access their own information, nor do they have an
incentive to “hide” their conduct from each other. In complex
litigation, however, some plaintiffs file complaints that speculate as
to facts about their own conduct or condition, or the conduct or
condition of unnamed class members.218 This Part investigates
whether Twombly and Iqbal place limitations on this aspect of
pleading and the scope of any such limitation.
215. See Spencer, supra note 6, at 459 (“[T]he [Twombly] standard will be more demanding
in the context of claims in which direct evidence supporting the wrongdoing is difficult for
plaintiffs to identify at the complaint stage.”).
216. See Cavanagh, supra note 11, at 889.
217. See Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A10 (summarizing reactions of litigants, judges, and academics
to Iqbal’s question of how much information a plaintiff must possess about defendant actions).
218. See infra Part III.B.1.
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A. The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle
The plaintiff neutrality principle guides the application of the
Twombly/Iqbal standard to allegations the plaintiffs make about
their own conduct or condition. Stated simply, “neutral” allega-
tions—statements that give rise to multiple explanations, only some
of which are the result of wrongdoing—are sufficient as plausible
allegations for plaintiff conduct but are insufficient to describe
defendant or third party conduct.
The plaintiff neutrality principle rests on the premise that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to all statements in a
complaint subject to Rule 8(a)(2), including statements about a
plaintiff’s conduct or condition. The Iqbal decision emphasizes that
Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’”219
Although the statement answers the question whether the plausibil-
ity standard applies to all types of civil actions, not just complex
cases or antitrust suits, the Court’s broad and decisive language
indicates that it applies to other types of statements within a
complaint as well.220
The effect of applying Twombly/Iqbal standard allegations of
plaintiff conduct or condition is the same as applying the standard
to any other allegations in a complaint. That is, if the statements
do not meet the plausibility standard, then the lawsuit will be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).221 The fact that the plausibility
standard applies to all aspects of a Rule 8(a)(2) complaint, however,
does not mean that “plausibility” will have the same meaning in all
contexts. Just as the bar for plausibility varies with the cost of
219. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
220. Id. Even without the strong language of Iqbal, there is precedent for understanding
Rule 8(a)(2) as the background or default standard for pleading. For example, courts
interpreting the application of the Rule 9(b) PSLRA pleading standards have maintained that
Rule 8(a) is the standard applicable to the aspects of a complaint that fall outside of these
specialized pleading rules. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Because Rule 9(b) and
the PSLRA apply only to allegations of defendant conduct, this indicates how courts would
treat any “division” of allegations into those about plaintiffs and those about
defendants—Rule 8(a) is the default background standard applicable to allegations about both
plaintiffs and defendants. Because the plausibility standard applies to all statements made
under Rule 8(a)(2), this standard is now the “default.”
221. The other alternative in class action cases would be to deny class certification. This,
however, is not an option because Twombly and Iqbal do not directly apply to the issue of
class certification. See supra Part I.C. 
2046 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1997
litigation,222 the definition of plausible also may vary depending on
whether the allegation is one describing defendant or plaintiff
conduct.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus is a useful
starting point.223 This case, decided only a few weeks after Twombly,
concerned a plaintiff’s allegation about his own condition or conduct.
Erickson, the plaintiff, was a prisoner who filed a pro se lawsuit
alleging that the prison officials had denied him his Hepatitis C
medication in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.224 The
complaint alleged that “he was suffering from ‘continued damage to
[his] liver’ as a result of the nontreatment.”225 Thus, the allegation
at issue did not involve any speculation about the conduct of persons
beyond the plaintiff’s own personal knowledge. After reviewing the
complaint, the district court held, and the court of appeals affirmed,
that this allegation was conclusory, and that he needed to allege
further facts to support the allegation that he suffered “a cognizable
independent harm” due to the removal of the medication.226 In a
short per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed and held that
plaintiff’s allegation that he had Hepatitis C and the medication
had been withheld was sufficient to allege that he suffered liver
damage.227 
Commentators greeted Erickson with confusion and skepticism
because of the Court’s cryptic citation of Twombly in support of the
Conley v. Gibson notice pleading ideal.228 However, once it is set in
the broader context of allegations concerning defendant and plain-
tiff conduct, one understands that Erickson serves to assuage the
inevitable post-Twombly doubts that notice pleading had been
222. See supra Part II.A; see also Spencer, supra note 66, at 4 (“[T]he type of factual detail
needed to achieve this goal varies depending on the legal and factual context in which a claim
is situated.”).
223. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
224. Id. at 91-92.
225. Id. at 91 (quoting Colo. Dept. of Corr. Offender Grievance Form (June 30, 2004)).
226. Id. at 93 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, No. 06-1114, 2006 WL 2640394, at *4 (10th Cir.
Sept. 14, 2006)).
227. Id. at 92-94. The Court also noted that his complaint should be read with particular
deference because he was a pro se litigant. Id. at 94.
228. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 6, at 883 (“To confuse matters even further, just three
weeks after the Court decided Twombly, it upheld the sufficiency of a complaint in Erickson
v. Pardus without even mentioning the plausibility standard.”).
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completely cast aside. Erickson is an illustration of the concept that
I have labeled the “plaintiff neutrality principle.” According to this
principle, factual allegations of a plaintiff’s own conduct, or
condition for which there are both lawful and unlawful explana-
tions, are sufficient to state a claim.
The Twombly opinion prominently features concerns about
discovery and the cost of litigation—worries that are noticeably
absent in Erickson. This is not surprising, however, since proof of
the allegation would not require the defendants to engage in lengthy
or expensive discovery. When it comes to a plaintiff’s medical
condition, the plaintiff himself is assumed to possess the relevant
knowledge, and to the extent to which the allegations require
discovery for proof, the cost will fall on the plaintiff.229 
One can make sense of this position by arguing that the Supreme
Court tacitly assumed that allegations made by the plaintiff about
his own condition were the clearest to single out as “safe” from
accusations of speculativeness and conclusory nature. Erickson,
taken together with Twombly and Iqbal, illuminates the utility of
the “neutrality” concept in discerning which allegations meet the
plausibility standard.
This is not the only possible reading of the Erickson case. One
might eschew the effort to draw any principles at all from the
decision, choosing instead to dismiss the per curiam opinion as a
decision of little consequence in which the Court simply set the very
outer boundaries for when a judge may dismiss a case for factual
insufficiency on a 12(b)(6) motion. There are, however, independent
reasons to support the plaintiff neutrality principle within the
operation of the Twombly/Iqbal standard. Even if the plaintiff
neutrality principle does not spring directly from Erickson, it is, at
least, consistent with the holding and reasoning of that case.
As outlined earlier, when addressing allegations of defendant
conduct, the Supreme Court cast a skeptical eye on “neutral” alle-
gations.230 It was precisely this neutrality that led the Court to
demand that the plaintiffs in both Twombly and Iqbal supply
229. See, e.g., Erickson, 551 U.S. at 92-94.
230. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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additional facts to “nudge” the allegations from neutral territory
into the realm of the plausible.231 
Plaintiff conduct, however, appears to be different. Allegations
about plaintiff conduct or condition are the mirror image of the
neutrality principle for allegations regarding defendant or third-
party conduct. When there are multiple possible explanations for
defendant conduct, the plaintiff must plead extra facts to show the
plausibility of the explanation based on unlawful conduct.232 In most
ordinary lawsuits, however, when a plaintiff’s conduct or condition
rests in this neutral world of multiple explanations, no extra facts
are needed.233 
The plaintiff neutrality principle, then, considerably narrows the
world of allegations that are affected by the plausibility standard.
This observation lends support to those who have claimed that
Twombly and Iqbal do not, in fact, represent a major shift in plead-
ing doctrine.234 However, rather than arguing that Twombly and
Iqbal have not changed pleading requirements in a meaningful way,
the plaintiff neutrality principle demonstrates that the plausibility
requirement operates in a constrained class of allegations. When the
plaintiff neutrality principle is conceptualized as a constraint on the
scope of Twombly and Iqbal, it shows that Twombly and Iqbal have
a narrower application than once thought, but it also demonstrates
that the plaintiff neutrality principle maintains some of the stability
of the old pleading regime. 
The plaintiff neutrality principle does not, however, give plaintiffs
a free pass into the implausible. In its concern with neutral
allegations, the principle ensures that plaintiffs will not have to
supply extra facts to bolster a claim for which at least one plausible
231. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
232. The Court adopted this approach by explicitly rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s argument
that the plaintiff’s harm could have been caused by “the discontinuance of the treatment itself
shortly after it began” or the harm “he already faced from the Hepatitis C itself.’” Erickson,
551 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, No. 06-1114,
2006 WL 2640394, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2006)).
233. This insight throws into doubt the contention that the Court has not abandoned the
principle that when a court decides a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must draw all
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The differing neutrality requirements reveal that in some
cases the court will resolve inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and in others, the court will
refuse to do so.
234. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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allegation exists that suggests the existence of wrong-doing. It does
not  sanction any allegation a plaintiff makes about his own conduct
or condition simply because it is about the plaintiff himself. For
example, the allegation “I ate twinkies. Twinkies caused my hepa-
titis to worsen” would be insufficient.
The plaintiff neutrality principle is consistent with recent
accounts of Twombly as operating on a “baseline” or “presumption-
based” theory of behavior. Professor Spencer’s presumption-based
theory posits that some sets of facts, such as “B struck A with his
motor vehicle[,] ... suggest wrongdoing and thus enjoy the presump-
tion of impropriety” because people do not ordinarily strike others
with their cars.235 Other sets of facts, such as “B fired A from her job
and B was damaged” are not entitled to the presumption of
impropriety because such events “in our society [do] not ordinarily
or presumptively [occur] for inappropriate reasons.”236 Professor
Bone has explained this concept in terms of a “baseline” of “normal
state[s] of affairs for situations of the same general type as those
described in the complaint.”237 Twombly thus requires “allegations
that differ in some significant way from what usually occurs in the
baseline and differ in a way that supports a higher probability of
wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated with baseline conduct.”238
The plaintiff neutrality principle instructs that a court should
accept a plaintiff’s assertions about his own status as the appropri-
ate baseline for conduct. This concept is illustrated by the following
graph:
235. Spencer, supra note 66, at 15.
236. Id. In explaining Twombly, Spencer proposed that speculative propositions cannot
overcome a presumption of propriety. Id. at 16.
237. Bone, supra note 6, at 885.
238. Id. at 885-86. Bone argues that his baseline theory provides clarity that Spencer’s
presumption theory lacks, but the differences between the two seem trivial. Id. at 888.
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In other words, the mirror image of the Twombly rule for
defendants is that the factually neutral statements about plaintiff’s
condition that the Court accepted as plausible under Erickson could
be “nudged” back into the territory of implausibility when conditions
of speculation hold. 
The plaintiff neutrality principle should hold even when the
condition that the plaintiff alleges is not something that persons
routinely experience. Suppose, for example, the plaintiff alleges that
he suffers from a rare disease. There are three reasons to treat this
sort of allegation as plausible, even if it is statistically rare. First,
the relevant cause of action would most likely include a causation
element so that the existence of the condition is moored to other
facts that involve the defendant or third parties. Second, as ex-
plained before, the plaintiff is in the best position to make allega-
tions about his own condition.239 Finally, costs of discovery imposed
on the defendant are relatively low because the plaintiff is not
seeking to uncover the relevant information from the defendant
itself.240












239. Rule 11 continues to function as a backstop against wholesale lying. FED. R. CIV. P.
11.
240. See Stancil, supra note 118, at 129-32 (describing the internal and external defense
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The plaintiff neutrality principle, then, offers a more complete
account of a “baseline” theory because it demonstrates that the
relevant baseline for Twombly purposes is inseparable from the
vantage point of the claimant.
B. The Group Plaintiff Neutrality Principle
The plaintiff neutrality principle outlined in the previous Section
states that when a plaintiff makes a statement or allegation
concerning her own condition or conduct that is neutral (subject to
inferences of both lawful and unlawful conduct on the part of the
defendant), it is not speculative and is therefore entitled to a
presumption of truth for the purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. 
This interpretation of Twombly, Iqbal, and Erickson, however,
does not mean that any allegation of plaintiff conduct or condition
should carry an automatic presumption of truth. Those allegations
that a court might consider “facially implausible” (for example,
beyond the realm of neutrality) are addressed in Part III.C.
Allegations of plaintiff conduct that might be considered “specula-
tive” are addressed here. 
The plaintiff structure of complex litigation is one in which
allegations of plaintiff conduct or status do not conform to the
baseline of normal conduct that underpins the plaintiff neutrality
principle. When one plaintiff makes allegations of conduct that
apply only to herself, the plausibility of these allegations is pre-
sumed, but when these allegations apply not only to herself but to
other plaintiffs who are either unnamed class members or other
litigants in a mass tort litigation who utilize a standard form
complaint, the plausibility of these allegations is less clear. This
context challenges one premise of the plaintiff neutrality princi-
ple—that allegations about plaintiff conduct or condition are not
speculative because they do not involve the conduct or condition of
other persons. This Section addresses that problem and suggests
that these contexts require a different principle, the “group plaintiff
neutrality principle,” which states that allegations of plaintiff
costs in ordinary cases, such as those where an individual plaintiff’s condition is at issue).
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conduct or condition that are neutral should be understood as
plausible unless the relevant baseline for that group’s condition
suggests otherwise.
1. Nonspeculative Allegations of Group Plaintiff Conduct
Class action complaints are least speculative of plaintiff behavior
when the cause of action requires very little conduct on the part of
a plaintiff and the conduct is easily ascertainable. This will be the
case when the cause of action requires no allegation of plaintiff
conduct, or when the only conduct required of the plaintiff is
definitional to the class itself.
Some causes of action focus completely on the actions of the
defendant. Two examples would be class actions alleging ERISA
violations such as an unlawful plan violation or “stock drop” cases
alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. These cases typically allege that
the defendants’ conduct toward class members was uniformly
wrongful.241 In such cases, the named plaintiffs need not speculate
in the complaint as to behavior of other plaintiffs in order to
establish that a cause of action exists. This is true even in cases in
which the ultimate measure of monetary relief might differ among
plaintiffs.242 
Other causes of action in this category require some minimal
action by the plaintiff, but the only plaintiff conduct at stake is that
which defines the plaintiff as a class member in the first place.
Twombly itself is an example of such a class action. The Twombly
complaint alleged an illegal agreement among the ILEC telecom-
munication providers.243 To qualify, a plaintiff class member only
241. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. ERISA Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 883, 895 (E.D. Mich.
2008). Because of this fact, these cases are often certified as Rule 23(b)(1)(A) actions seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e.g., Allen v. Holiday Universal, 249 F.R.D. 166, 188-90
(E.D. Pa. 2008). I do not mean to argue, however, that all lawsuits that would qualify for
23(b)(1)(A) or 23(b)(1)(B) certification (no opt out) would never involve speculative plaintiff
behavior.
242. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 457, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[T]he
appropriate focus in a breach of fiduciary duty claim is the conduct of the defendants, not the
plaintiffs. Even if there are significant differences in the damages ... both groups must prove
the same core issues: whether there were misrepresentations and whether the defendants
even acted as fiduciaries.” (citation omitted)).
243. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
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needed to have subscribed to “local telephone and/or high speed
internet services” during the relevant class period.244 In other words,
the named plaintiffs did not speculate about unnamed class
members’ actions in subscribing to telephone or Internet services
because any person who was not a subscriber was not a member of
the putative class.245
2. Speculative Allegations of Group Plaintiff Conduct
While some class actions do not require speculation about class
member conduct by the named plaintiff, other class actions do
involve complaints in which the named plaintiff makes assertions
about the conduct or condition of unnamed class members. For
example, consumer products liability class actions often require that
the plaintiffs relied upon a statement or warranty by the manufac-
turer or used a product in a given way.246
The most delicate aspect of applying the Twombly/Iqbal standard
to these statements in class action complaints is to disaggregate the
question of existence of a cause of action from the question about
whether a certifiable class exists under Rule 23. The plausibility
pleading standard in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must not be
used as a shortcut to the denial of class certification.247
Judges already have seized upon Twombly and Iqbal to squelch
class actions on the ground that the plaintiff speculated as to the
facts of other class members. For example, in Hodczak v. Latrobe
Specialty Steel Co., four former employees of Latrobe Specialty Steel
filed an age discrimination lawsuit under the ADEA claiming that
they were unlawfully terminated on the basis of age.248 The
plaintiffs filed on behalf of a class of “all present salaried employees
244. Id.
245. Issues relating to speculation in the definition and certification of the class itself are
addressed supra in Part I.C.
246. Many securities and fraud actions also require some measure of reliance on the part
of the plaintiff, and although parts of defendant conduct are governed by Rule 9(b) or the
PSLRA, the statements about plaintiff conduct remain under the Twombly/Iqbal Rule 8(a)
standard. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for an example of a case cautioning courts
not to decide issues of class certification under the guise of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.
248. No. 08-649, 2009 WL 911311, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009).
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of Latrobe who are least 40 years of age and who are, therefore, at
risk of being terminated by Latrobe.”249 The magistrate judge, in a
report and recommendation adopted by the district judge, held that
the individual named plaintiffs had stated a claim but that the
putative class had not.250 The court held that the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions as to the class members were “devoid of any facts which would
support a collective action or which suggest that other class
members even exist.”251 The court further stated that the allegations
were mere conclusions, “purely speculative and insufficient to state
a claim under Twombly.”252 Barely three months later, another
district court concluded that “[a]fter Twombly, courts in this circuit
have found that class allegations must also comply with Rule 8(a)
in order to proceed to class discovery.”253 
It is improper for a court to decide issues of class certification
during a motion to dismiss.254 Beyond the doctrinal bar of deciding
Rule 23 issues in a Rule 12 motion, there is an added danger that
this practice could squeeze some legitimate class actions out of
existence. Similar to the fear that Iqbal will prevent plaintiffs from
using the litigation process to uncover wrongdoing by government
officials because “information about wrongdoing is often secret,”255
a requirement that named plaintiffs not “speculate” about the
activities of unnamed or unknown class members could be similarly
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *9. The relevant paragraphs of the complaint stated: 
26. Hodczak’s termination, along with three other employees in their late fifties
or early sixties, on November 8, 2007, is part of a systematic pattern and
practice of terminating older employees. LSS has targeted a class of employees
over the age of forty for termination based largely, if not exclusively, on their
age. In fact, the four that were fired, were among the oldest in the company.
27. Each of the victims of LSS’s age discrimination, including each of the three
who were terminated with Hodczak, is similarly situated to the others, and
Hodczak is similarly situated to all of them. 
Id.
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. Nicholas v. CMRE Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-4857, 2009 WL 1652275, at *4 (D.N.J. June
11, 2009).
254. See supra Part I.C.
255. See Liptak, supra note 217, at A10 (“Plaintiffs claiming they were the victims of ... a
policy of harsh treatment in detention may not know exactly who harmed them and how
before filing suit.”).
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self-defeating for class actions. Motions to dismiss should not
become shadowed by impoverished class certification proceedings.
This problem calls for a principle consistent with Rule 8(a)
doctrine that enables courts to distinguish the occasional genuinely
implausible class action complaint256 from instances in which a
named plaintiff makes speculative allegations of other plaintiffs’
conduct that are permissible, and in fact, necessary to the structure
of the class action.
The “group plaintiff neutrality principle” builds on the foundation
of the plaintiff neutrality principle. Once the court has established
that the named plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief,
the inquiry should shift to the question of whether it is plausible
that there are other similarly situated persons who would make up
the plaintiff class. If the pleading rules required the named plaintiff
to state facts about all of the other plaintiffs, this would defeat the
purpose of the class action vehicle. 
Any “plausibility” inquiry, then, will focus on the existence of a
group qua group, rather than a group as the aggregate actions or
conditions of individuals. The class certification process accounts for
the fact that actual differences in class member condition and
behavior ultimately will determine the scope and content of any
classes and subclasses.
In other words, the question is whether the class has a cause of
action, not whether it is plausible that, given the requirements of
Rule 23, a class would be certified. The class should be entitled to a
similar, but slightly weaker, presumption of plausibility concerning
neutral facts. The neutral facts should cut in the same direction of
the named plaintiff; because the named plaintiff already has know-
ledge about his own conduct or condition, this suggests plausibility
for at least one person. After that, a court should be aware of base-
line conditions that would raise red flags about a group of people all
having the same cause of action.
As a complement to the weaker presumption of plausibility, the
judge who goes so far as to dismiss a class action complaint for lack
256. Even before Twombly some courts held that, on rare occasion, an extremely unlikely
putative class could be dismissed on the merits instead of through a Rule 23 proceeding. See,
e.g., Morency v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 98-C-8436, 1999 WL 754713,
at *2-5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999).
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of factually sufficient allegations of plaintiff conduct or condition
should do so without prejudice. This permits plaintiffs to refile
claims after further investigation and tailoring of its own members,
thus protecting members of the group whose allegations were
always factually sufficient, but whose sufficiency might have been
drowned in the sea of the group complaint.
C. Twombly, Iqbal, and Multidistrict Litigation Master         
Complaints
The plaintiff neutrality principle and the group plaintiff neutral-
ity principle address the question of how a court should treat
neutral allegations of plaintiff conduct or condition. This Section
considers the question of whether a plaintiff’s allegation about his
own conduct or condition violates the Twombly/Iqbal principle on
the basis that it is facially implausible. When publicly available
data cast doubt on the possibility that a large number of plaintiffs
could all have the condition that they allege that they have, then a
court may be justified in using the plausibility standard to dismiss
these complaints without prejudice.
A general inquiry into facial implausibility of allegations (con-
cerning both plaintiff and defendant conduct) is beyond the scope of
this Article and has been addressed by several other commentators.
The important point to remember for purposes of this Article is that
the plaintiff and group plaintiff neutrality principles are devices for
identifying the role of neutral facts in a complaint. Although they
allow a plaintiff to proceed on allegations that suggest multiple
interpretations, some signifying defendant wrongdoing and others
suggesting causes that do not implicate defendant wrongdoing,
these principles do not entitle plaintiffs to assert fanciful allega-
tions, or allegations for which there are zero interpretations sug-
gesting defendant wrongdoing.
1. Attacking the Sufficiency of a Master Complaint
A multidistrict litigation (MDL) is a method of aggregating a
large number of cases that are pending in several federal judicial
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districts.257 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML)
can order the transfer of cases with “common questions of fact ... to
any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”258
Although the transferee judge must send cases back to the original
district for trial,259 the MDL is a powerful aggregation device
because most cases settle before trial.260 The procedural require-
ments for class actions litigated in federal court have made class
certification increasingly difficult over the past few decades.
Therefore, mass tort actions that cannot be litigated as class actions
because individual issues of causation and injury predominate over
common issues are often aggregated using the MDL device.261 
Although each plaintiff in an MDL technically sues in her own
name, many mass tort MDLs have come to function much like class
actions in the pretrial phase.262 Judges appoint committees of lead
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys to coordinate discovery and
other pretrial practice.263 Although each plaintiff technically has her
257. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
258. Id.
259. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1998)
(holding that the transferee court must return cases to the transferor court when pretrial
proceedings have finished).
260. See, e.g., Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 2323, 2329-30 (2008); Resnik, supra note 175, at 928 (“[F]unctionally MDL is the end
point of many cases.”); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation
If a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 n.4 (2008) (“Few cases are
remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court.”).
261. See, e.g., Stier, supra note 206, at 913-15; Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in
an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 527, 543-46 (2002); James M. Wood, The Judicial Coordination of Drug and Device
Litigation: A Review and Critique, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325, 337-41 (1999). Another common
problem is that a nationwide class action relying on state law causes of action would require
the application of the laws of all fifty states. Such class actions thus do not meet the Rule 23
requirements of commonality and manageability. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288
F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297
(7th Cir. 1995).
262. See Marcus, supra note 190, at 890-92 (describing the loss of control over master
complaints and other common documents in MDL litigation); Resnik, supra note 175, at 930-
31 (noting certain ways in which “MDLs function as temporary de facto class actions”).
263. See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 6, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 850962 (E.D.
La. Apr. 8, 2005) (No. 1657) (appointing attorneys for plaintiffs’ and defendant’s steering
committees); Case Management Order No. 2 at 5-8, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site
Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2005) (No. 21 MC 100 (AKH)) (appointing
plaintiff and defendant liaison counsel); see also Resnik, supra note 175, at 931 (“[U]nder the
MDL rubric, trial judges may also appoint lead counsel and plaintiff steering committees,
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own lawyer, in practice, she is often more or less represented by the
lead counsel.264 This structure has been praised for streamlining
litigation costs and facilitating global settlements of mass torts, and
criticized for replicating some of the problems that beset both
plaintiffs and defendants in the class action context.265 
Consider the comparison of pleadings across the two procedural
devices. In a class action, the named representative files a complaint
on behalf of the class. In an MDL, each plaintiff files her own
complaint. Even though a number of plaintiffs are joined together
in one action, an MDL is different from a class action because each
plaintiff is still identified by name, and must be joined properly as
a plaintiff under the Federal Rules266 or consolidated pursuant to an
order of the JPML.267 Despite this requirement, many plaintiffs in
mass tort MDLs file a complaint that resembles the class action
complaint of a named class representative insofar as it follows a
form or is part of a master complaint.268 These complaints are often
approved by the supervising judge. Use of such pleadings facilitates
a degree of uniformity across the litigants so that the court and
parties may more easily see the scope of causes of action, injuries
alleged, and damages demanded across the field of plaintiffs. 
One consequence of this practice is that a master complaint may
come to look a good deal like a class action complaint in which one
document alleges the claims for relief of many.269 MDL complaints
should differ from class action complaints in that an MDL complaint
transforming these attorneys into lawyers for a group.”).
264. See Mitchell A. Lowenthall & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation,
Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 999
(1995) (“[T]he court may (and usually does) impose a structure and set ground rules for a
‘steering committee,’ and decisions of the committee bind all of the aggregated claims.”).
265. See Erichson, supra note 160, at 519-30.
266. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a), 20(a).
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
268. For example, in In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, thousands of rescue
and clean-up workers at the World Trade Center site filed lawsuits alleging respiratory
injuries. See Effron, supra note 176, at 208-15 for a detailed account of these lawsuits. Judge
Alvin K. Hellerstein has organized a system of “check-off” complaints. Id. at 212. Under this
system, several master complaints allege claims for relief for relevant groups of plaintiffs. Id.
Then, each plaintiff submits a “check-off” complaint in which he fills in a form that alleges the
time and place of exposure, the injury alleged, and the compensation sought. Id.
269. For these limited purposes, it is useful to think of the MDL as an “entity” along the
lines that David Shapiro has proposed for class actions. See Shapiro, supra note 100, at 913-
42.
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must also contain an individualized aspect in which each plaintiff
alleges her own injury, causation, and damages. Given this distinc-
tion there should be no speculation on the part of MDL plaintiffs
about other plaintiffs. 
If, however, the MDL complaint is treated as a quasi-class action
complaint with just a few “minor” individualized differences, the
possibility of speculation begins to appear. The defense bar is
unlikely to jettison the entire master complaint model because
defendants themselves reap significant efficiency benefits from
litigating an aggregated claim.270 They might, however, reach for
Twombly and Iqbal to help them in reducing the number of lawsuits
at the beginning of the litigation. As one lawyer for the pharmaceu-
tical industry opined,
while we don’t mind standardization of allegations across large
numbers of complaints, we may be better off putting plaintiffs to
their pleadings individually. If Rule 12 requires a plaintiff at
least to plead in good faith one fact affirmatively indicating that
the defendant’s promotion affected his or her prescriber, then
that requires more than a cookie-cutter complaint churned out
by a mindless word processor. So defendants should consider
whether master complaints do them any good after
Twombly/Iqbal.271
Twombly and Iqbal recently have been used to attack the factual
sufficiency of MDL master complaints. The master complaint, once
a relatively uncontroversial procedural device, has become a new
battleground for testing the merits of cases brought by groups of
claimants. The district judge overseeing the NuvaRing contraceptive
MDL denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of plausibility
because “the master consolidated complaint in this action was sim-
ply meant to be an administrative tool to place in one document all
of the claims at issue in this litigation.”272 Therefore, he concluded,
270. See generally David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000) (detailing the benefits that defendants enjoy
from preparing general defenses and strategies to similar claims).
271. Reconsidering the Master Complaint, http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/08/
reconsidering-master-complaint.html (Aug. 20, 2009, 09:30 EST).
272. In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08MD1964 RWS, 2009 WL 2425391, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 2009); see also In re Traysol Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-MD-1928, 2009 WL
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a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss cannot be brought against a
master complaint. Another MDL judge faced with a similar motion
admitted uncertainty in determining “how a master complaint
should be treated when it is challenged via Rule 12(b)(6)” in the
post-Twombly and Iqbal era given the existence of case law
emphasizing the MDL master complaint’s role as an administrative
tool “as opposed to being a primary operative pleading.”273 
These decisions already have touched off a spirited debate among
practitioners about the proper response to a motion to dismiss a
master complaint for factual insufficiency.274 In the same way that
Twombly and Iqbal have forced courts to clarify the boundaries
between motions for class certification and motions to dismiss
because a class has not stated a claim, these cases have moved the
question of the precise pleading role of a master complaint to the
forefront of MDL practice. The NuvaRing judge’s conclusion that a
MDL master complaint is not an appropriate target for a motion to
dismiss is a rather blunt tool for protecting the integrity of aggre-
gated claimants at the outset of litigation, especially because it gives
rise to the not unreasonable charge that the judge has carved out
MDL complaints as an exception to the Iqbal standard for plead-
ings. As an alternative, judges should use the plaintiff and group
plaintiff neutrality principles to evaluate plaintiff directed allega-
tions in a complaint and dismiss a master complaint for insufficient
factual allegations in only two situations: (1) when the allegations
of defendant or third-party conduct are implausible according to the
Twombly and Iqbal standard, or (2) when allegations of plaintiff
conduct or condition are facially implausible.
2. Plausibility by the Numbers
One aspect of facial implausibility that directly implicates
allegations of plaintiff condition or conduct in complex litigation is
577726 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2009) (cited by the NuvaRing court for the proposition that judges
should curtail motion practice against master complaints).
273. In re Digitek Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:08-md-01968, 2009 WL 2433468, at *8
(S.D. W. Va. Aug. 3, 2009).
274. See Drug and Device Law, http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2010/01/nuvaring-
cycle-revisited.html (Jan. 12, 2010, 08:00 EST); Paul D. Rheingold & Hunger J. Shkolnik,
NuvaRing Meets Iqbal, LAW 360, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.Law360.com/articles/141676.
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the use of statistical data to examine the plausibility of an allega-
tion. This applies equally to actions filed as class actions, as well as
those that are litigated as MDLs. 
One can find an egregious illustration of the phenomenon of
“cookie-cutter” complaints resulting in plaintiff speculation in the
silicosis MDL litigated before Judge Janis Jack in the Southern
District of Texas.275 The silicosis litigation involved 10,000 lawsuits
alleging personal injury after exposure to silica.276 Silica is a mineral
found in the earth’s crust, and workers in “occupations such as
abrasive blasting (i.e. ‘sandblasting’), mining, quarrying, and rock
drilling” may be exposed to the substance.277 Inhalation of silica
particles can lead to silicosis, a disease that can cause a host of
respiratory problems, cancer, and autoimmune disease.278 Although
silicosis is relatively rare, the spate of silicosis lawsuits appeared in
Mississippi and the surrounding states in a very short period of
time.
Judge Jack uncovered a host of unethical practices used by the
plaintiffs’ lawyers to amass the thousands of litigants in this
MDL.279 The plaintiffs’ lawyers primarily employed litigation
screening companies to identify and screen workers who might have
been exposed to silica.280 These screenings involved little more than
an X-ray which was then examined by one of a handful of doctors
employed by the screening companies, none of whom had any actual
contact with the “patient.”281 Some doctors screened up to sixty
patients per day.282
In the silicosis litigation, Judge Jack did not directly address the
meritoriousness of any of the individual lawsuits because the
rulings were confined to the admissibility of the expert testimony
under Daubert.283 The implication of excluding the testimony,
275. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
276. Id. at 573.
277. Id. at 570.
278. Id. at 569.
279. Id. at 580, 596-600.
280. The use of “litigation screening” companies is not a new phenomenon. See generally
Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61
SMU L. REV. 1221 (2008) for a strong critique of this practice.
281. In re Silica, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 580, 596-600.
282. Id. at 616.
283. Id. 563, 566-69 (summarizing rulings). Many of the cases were remanded to state court
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
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however, was obvious. Thousands of plaintiffs based their claims for
relief on a diagnosis of a disease, and the judge found that the
doctors’ diagnoses of silicosis were inadmissible. It was unlikely that
such cases would survive a motion for summary judgment, and the
plaintiffs dropped the majority of the lawsuits.
In her opinion, Judge Jack attacked the assertions of each doctor
who made a silicosis diagnosis as well as the screening companies
and technicians involved in soliciting and diagnosing plaintiffs.284
The findings that the diagnoses were inadmissible as a group
undermined the basis for the diagnosis of plaintiffs on an individual
basis. The Daubert decisions, however, reveal a larger skepticism of
the epidemiological basis of the MDL on the part of the court, a
skepticism that motivated and bolstered the individual findings as
to each doctor.285 In short, the court found it implausible that such
a high number of silicosis diagnoses were made in a short period of
time in a relatively dense geographic area.286
If this logic is applied to the motion to dismiss context, one reason
to doubt the diagnosis of any individual plaintiff was that the
diagnoses in the aggregate were implausible because they were part
of a “phantom epidemic.”287 Consider a complaint in which the
plaintiff alleges that (1) plaintiff worked at ABC Corporation
worksite where silica particles were present from X date to Y date,
and (2) plaintiff now suffers from silicosis. Before Twombly, these
allegations would most likely be presumed true for the sake of
deciding the motion to dismiss.288 Now, however, the statement
“plaintiff suffers from silicosis” is subject to further scrutiny, and a
court might deem it to be “conclusory” under Iqbal’s two-step pro-
cess.289 Taken individually, the statements should be plausible
under Erickson and the plaintiff neutrality principle that I proposed
in Part III.A. Each plaintiff makes allegations about his own work
pattern and medical condition, and although the statement about
silicosis is neutral (subject to multiple inferences), a court should
treat that statement as plausible. Even if the probability that an
284. Id. at 612-20.
285. Id. at 572, 620.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 572.
288. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
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individual has a certain condition is relatively low, the court should
still treat the allegation as plausible.290
In the silicosis litigation, however, the court was not looking at
each complaint in a vacuum, but at thousands of complaints, each
alleging the same illness. The publicly available data that the de-
fendants cited in their opposition brief pointed to two points of
implausibility regarding the plaintiffs’ claims as a group. First, the
court reported the incidence of silicosis in the general population
and compared it to the “silicosis crisis” in Mississippi.291
“[B]ased on data from NIOSH’s silicosis surveillance system ...
there would be between 36 and 73 cases of silicosis diagnosed in
Mississippi per year,”292 which was consistent with the number of
silicosis cases filed in Mississippi in 2000 and 2001.293 The com-
plaints filed in the silicosis litigation, however, looked quite
different because “[t]his explosion in the number of silicosis claims
in Mississippi suggests a silicosis epidemic 20 times worse than the
Hawk’s Nest incident.”294
290. See supra Part III.A.
291. In re Silica, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 571-72.
292. Id. at 571 n.8.
293. Id. at 571.
294. Id. at 571-72. Judge Jack’s full analysis is worth repeating:
[I]n 2002, the number of new Mississippi silicosis claims skyrocketed to
approximately 10,642. In 2003 and 2004, the number of new silicosis claims in
Mississippi continued to be shockingly high, at 7,228 claims in 2003 and 2,609
claims in 2004. By way of comparison, in 2002, on average, more silicosis claims
were filed per day in Mississippi courts than had been filed for the entire year
only two years earlier. And during 2002-2004, the 20,479 new silicosis claims in
Mississippi are over five times greater than the total number of silicosis cases
one would expect over the same period in the entire United States.
This explosion in the number of silicosis claims in Mississippi suggests a
silicosis epidemic 20 times worse than the Hawk’s Nest incident. Indeed, these
claims suggest perhaps the worst industrial disaster in recorded world history.
And yet, these claims do not look anything like what one would expect from
an industrial disaster. One would expect an industrial disaster to look like the
Hawk’s Nest incident: presenting cases of acute silicosis (with relatively brief
incubation periods), emanating from a single worksite or geographic area with
an extremely high concentration of silica. To the contrary, virtually all of these
silicosis claims are for chronic or classic silicosis (with incubation periods in
excess of 15 years). The claims do not involve a single worksite or area, but
instead represent hundreds of worksites scattered throughout the state of
Mississippi, a state whose silicosis mortality rate is among the lowest in the
nation.
Id.
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This and other observations led Judge Jack to conclude that “this
appears to be a phantom epidemic, unnoticed by everyone other
than those enmeshed in the legal system.”295 
The second problem was that at least 4031 of the plaintiffs from
one screening company were also plaintiffs in asbestos litigation
claiming asbestosis.296 Judge Jack noted how unlikely this outcome
was given that, “outside of the small cadre of doctors who diagnose
for screening companies, even a single case of a dual diagnosis of
silicosis and asbestosis is extremely rare.”297
The court presented some of this information as general back-
ground context for the decision, and other publicly available
information came in the context of the Daubert motions to exclude
the diagnoses.298 It reads, in other words, like the skepticism of a
judge looking at the information in a complaint and the arguments
of a defendant moving for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Judge Jack even
used the language of plausibility, agreeing with an expert that the
diagnoses were “not scientifically plausible.”299
Some interpretations of Twombly suggest that judges may use
statistical data to demonstrate implausibility because “the baseline
in Twombly follows from an application of economic theory to the
particular conditions of the telecommunications industry as alleged
in the complaint and revealed through publicly available sources.”300
The statistical data in a case like the silicosis litigation often
295. Id. at 572-73.
296. Id. at 603.
297. Id. at 628-29 (citing Dr. David Weill, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed.
Doc't Clearinghouse at 4 (Feb. 3, 2005) (“Even in China, where I saw workers with jobs
involving high exposure to asbestos and silica (such as sandblasting off asbestos insulation),
I did not see anyone or review chest radiographs of anyone who had both silicosis and
asbestosis.”); Dr. Paul Epstein, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc’t
Clearinghouse at 3 (Feb. 2, 2005) (“[I]t is my professional opinion that the dual occurrence of
asbestosis and silicosis is a clinical rarity.”); Dr. Theodore Rodman, Senate Judiciary
Committee Testimony, Fed. Doc't Clearinghouse at 2 (Feb. 2, 2005) (“Among the thousands
of chest x-rays which I reviewed in asbestos and silica exposed individuals, I cannot remember
a single chest x-ray which showed clear-cut findings of both asbestos exposure and silica
exposure.”)).
298. Id. at 570-72. The lengthy rulings on the diagnoses made by the nine doctors who
worked for the litigation screening companies reveal facts that make the complaints even less
credible, such as the fact that many of the doctors did not even conduct physical examinations
or take basic medical histories of the litigants. Id.
299. Id. at 629.
300. Bone, supra note 6, at 887-88.
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suggests that the complaints filed are far afield from the relevant
baseline—in the silicosis litigation, the normal occurrence of
silicosis in the relevant population.
This limited use of publicly available statistics is compatible with
the plaintiff neutrality principle (applicable to MDL complaints) and
the group plaintiff neutrality principle (applicable to class actions).
These principles address the question of how a court should treat
neutral allegations in a complaint, and most allegations pertaining
to plaintiff conduct or condition are neutral. The silicosis hypotheti-
cal, however, describes a situation of facial implausibility when the
allegations of the group are viewed as a whole.
The use of statistics to assess the plausibility of a group of
claimants leads to a potentially troubling implication: if it is per-
missible to use statistical rarity to condemn a group of claimants,
then what is to stop a court from using statistical rarity in individ-
ual cases to demand that claimants state additional facts to suggest
the plausibility of their claim? In other words, plausibility by the
numbers would appear to carve out an exception to the plaintiff
neutrality principle or swallow it altogether.
By way of illustration, the objection takes the following form.
Imagine lawsuits arising from the incidence of a medical condition,
Q. Medical Condition Q is associated with exposure to Product X.
Publicly available epidemiological data suggest that a very small
percentage of adults exposed to product X for a one-year period
develop Medical Condition Q. Some adults develop Medical Condi-
tion Q without any known exposure to Product X. 
In Hypothetical 1, one plaintiff files a complaint stating, in
relevant part, “I was exposed to Product X for a one-year period. I
developed Medical Condition Q on Date O. Product X was the cause
of my medical condition.” In Hypothetical 2, a group of 10,000
plaintiffs file individual complaints at roughly the same time, and
the cases are consolidated before a single judge. The plaintiffs, who
are all represented by the same three law firms, file complaints that
follow a master complaint that state, “I was exposed to Product X
from [date] to [date]. I developed Medical Condition Q on [date
range A-B]. Product X was the cause of my medical condition.”
In Hypothetical 1, the defendant manufacturer of Product X uses
publicly available epidemiological data to show that the plaintiff
had a 1 percent chance of developing Medical Condition Q at all, and
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that the plaintiff only had a 0.1 percent of developing Medical
Condition Q as the result of exposure to Product X. In Hypothetical
2, the defendant manufacturer of Product X uses publicly available
epidemiological data to show that, of the 10,000 persons who filed
claims, only 100 would be expected to develop Medical Condition Q
during date range A-B and only 10 would be expected to develop
Medical Condition Q as a result of exposure to Product X.
In each of these hypotheticals, the defendant is making an
argument about the plausibility of the allegations. In each situation,
there are two points at which the defendant attacks the plausibility,
first, in suggesting that it is implausible that a person would
develop Medical Condition Q at all, and second, that it is even less
likely that a person would develop Medical Condition Q as a result
of exposure to Product X. Each of these likelihoods must be exam-
ined under the plaintiff neutrality principle or the group plaintiff
neutrality principle and analyzed for the possibility of facial
implausibility.
In the case of the individual plaintiff, the plaintiff neutrality
principle would apply. There are explanations for the allegations
that suggest wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, and allega-
tions that suggest a wholly innocent explanation for the plaintiff’s
condition. The plaintiff is permitted to assert that indeed he does
suffer from Medical Condition Q. Even though there is only a small
chance that any given adult would have Medical Condition Q, the
plaintiff is in the best position to know directly or to investigate his
own condition prior to filing a lawsuit. The causation question is
also subject to the plaintiff neutrality principle. The plaintiff has a
good, if not perfect, opportunity to assess the likelihood of causation
prior to filing, and to the extent that this will require discovery
resources, the plaintiff will be responsible for a sizeable portion of
the expense of the investigation,301 serving as an outward sign of his
confidence in the truth of the allegations.302 
This result fits many people’s intuitions about pleading. Why
punish a plaintiff simply for suffering from a disease that is rare? To
the extent that the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show that
301. See Stancil, supra note 118, at 127 (“A 1986 Rand Corporation study found rough
parity between plaintiff’s nominal litigation costs and defendant’s costs in tort cases
generally.”).
302. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
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the illness and its causation are possible, then the plaintiff should
be allowed to go forward with the lawsuit.303
It is troubling, then, to arrive at precisely opposite intuitions in
Hypothetical 2. One wonders how it could possibly be true that all
or even half of the plaintiffs suffer from Medical Condition Q at all.
However, the probabilities in each hypothetical are exactly the
same. In other words, as a matter of statistical likelihood, the
plausibility of the allegations in each hypothetical is identical, and
since each plaintiff technically files his own complaint, the reason-
ing behind the plaintiff neutrality principle should remain constant.
The realities of modern MDL litigation, however, suggest that the
plaintiff neutrality principle should not be fully extended to this
situation. In order to determine if it would be appropriate to set
aside the plaintiff neutrality principle in the context of an MDL, a
court should examine whether the conditions that define a genu-
inely individual plaintiff are absent or greatly diminished. That is
to say, the plaintiff, when making allegations about his own conduct
or condition, is genuinely the narrator of his own story, that is, he
is not the subject of speculation by another plaintiff.304 
The group plaintiff scenario adds an extra inference to the world
of possible interpretations of facts. In the individual plaintiff sce-
nario, the possible inferences about the plaintiff-centered allega-
tions are either that the plaintiff has the condition alleged, or that
he does not. In the group plaintiff scenario, the additional possible
inference is that the conduct of a third party has interfered with the
plaintiffs allegations of his own conduct or condition. This could be
the result of blatantly unethical or even fraudulent behavior on the
part of lawyers or litigation screeners, or it could simply reflect that
lawyers with a large number of clients have fallen short of their
Rule 11 duties of reasonable investigation. 
The key to understanding why this situation is different from
the individual plaintiff situation is to comprehend the structural
differences in large-scale joinder devices. The proper analog for
abandoning the plaintiff neutrality principle is the class action, not
the MDL. This is because in the class action situation, the judge
303. These are the same intuitions and reasoning about plaintiffs’ motivations and access
to information that motivated the Supreme Court holding in Erickson and the resulting
plaintiff neutrality principle. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
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would treat the allegations of the group as a whole as implausible,
and the remedy would mirror the problem, that is, the complaint of
the group itself would be dismissed.305 However, in an MDL, this is
not the case. When publicly available data suggest that the claims
of the group are implausible, this serves to upend the plaintiff
neutrality principle. It does not, however, mean that the group qua
group must itself come forward with allegations indicating that the
group, as a whole, has stated a claim. 
Notice, however, that the rules of civil procedure already contain
protections against dismissing the claims of an entire group—these
are the procedures meant to ensure that class certification is
supported by the evidentiary foundations that a Rule 23 proceeding
is designed to unearth. A refusal to apply the plaintiff neutrality
principle to some MDLs would not doom the entire enterprise.
Rather, it would ensure that each litigant is a genuine claimant.
This is quite different from using the plausibility standard to attack
a class action as a whole, and in doing so, ending the entire lawsuit
for all class members. The argument is limited to the question of
how a judge should treat the group of complaints when data indicate
a plausibility problem with that group, and most MDLs do not show
such deficiencies.
I do not mean to condemn the use of master complaints and other
group pleading measures in their entirety. These devices can ease
the burden on litigants and the court in organizing many complex
cases. For example, after the NuvaRing judge declined to allow the
defendants to bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against the master
complaint, the defendants filed individual motions to dismiss
against each and every claimant.306 To the extent that these were
directed at allegations about defendant conduct that were common
to all of the complaints, these motions defeat some of the efficiencies
that MDLs are supposed to bring. Rather than attacking the
institution of the master complaint, the judge should determine if
any of the common allegations are about plaintiff conduct or
condition, and if so, whether these should be subjected to the group
305. However, as argued earlier, courts must take care not to conflate the issue of the
existence of a class with the issue of whether the class has stated a claim for which relief can
be granted. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
306. Rheingold & Shkolnik, supra note 274.
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plaintiff neutrality principle or even treated as facially implausible
based on publicly available data.
The argument presented here—that it is permissible under the
Twombly/Iqbal standard to use publicly available data to determine
plausibility—is limited to cases involving (a) group plaintiffs and (b)
allegations about plaintiff conduct or condition only. These limita-
tions build in a few protections for plaintiffs that are absent in the
“typical” Twombly scenario.
First, because the claims are about the plaintiff and not the
defendant, a finding of implausibility does not deny the plaintiffs
access to information about the defendants via discovery. It does
require some investigation on the part of the plaintiff before filing,
but it is not unreasonable, burdensome, or impossible without
judicial intervention. Second, it is possible for the court to dismiss
an individual case without prejudice, or to rule for a more definite
statement under the Federal Rules.307
Second, if used properly, the Twombly/Iqbal standard can protect
defendants and plaintiffs308 from lawyers looking to cast an
unnecessarily wide net. Those plaintiffs with genuine claims will
not have the value of any settlement or judgment diminished by the
presence of plaintiffs with unmeritorious claims or the money spent
to dismiss them from the action.
The kind of information that individual plaintiffs could supply to
supplement a master complaint should not be particularly onerous
to plaintiffs. The claimants should be required to provide further
detailed allegations about their own specific condition, for example,
to provide detail about dates and extent of symptoms experienced.309
Another possibility would be to supply allegations that negate the
inference that the plaintiff’s allegations are the product of specula-
tion by other plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION
Despite its grounding in the class action context, the Twombly
plausibility standard does not apply directly to the class certification
307. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
308. Plaintiffs do not go unharmed in these situations, as they are often subjected to
unnecessary tests, X-rays, etc.
309. This was utilized in the 9/11 complaints.
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context. The importance of applying a plausibility pleading standard
in the class action context is magnified by recent efforts to “federal-
ize” class actions in which Congress has made it easier for defen-
dants to remove state law complex cases to federal court.310 These
actions are then subject to the procedural hurdles that many
defendants perceive to be advantageous.311 A plausibility pleading
standard might be viewed as an additional procedural benefit to
litigating class actions in a federal forum.
The close examination of the plausibility standard in other
aspects of class action litigation, however, reveals that complex
litigation does indeed occupy a special place in pleading.
The nuanced and careful analysis that I suggest for applying the
Twombly/Iqbal standard to questions surrounding claims for relief
in complex litigation pleadings is not limited to that context. Rather,
a resistance to the urge to use “class action” or “complex case” as a
shortcut through tempered consideration of the actual costs and
merits of a case is a method applicable to all areas of pleading.
310. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1826 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
311. See Effron, supra note 176, at 228-29 (outlining the perceived advantages to
defendants for a federal forum in complex cases).
